Everyone agrees that a “conception” led to the disaster of October 7, yet without clearly defining this conception and understanding its roots, such consensus is meaningless. Public discourse and media often attribute the failure to terms like “disengagement” or “suitcases of money for Hamas,” but these are merely symptoms of a much deeper, flawed mindset that over time became broadly accepted among security institutions, political leadership, and Israeli society at large.

Outlining the “Conception”

The terror attack on October 7 did not occur in a vacuum. It resulted from a longstanding failure in Israel’s national security approach.

Since the onset of the Oslo Accords, and especially following the Gaza disengagement, a prevailing doctrine within Israel’s political and security establishments advocated containment rather than eradication of threats, hoping that economic improvement and easing restrictions on the enemy would suffice to restrain its aggression.

This approach had profound, long-term implications. It weakened Israeli deterrence, bolstered enemy confidence, and significantly eroded IDF capabilities, both logistically and operationally.

At the core of this conception was the idea that even temporary reoccupation of Gaza, or any enemy territory, was unthinkable. This view first emerged during the Oslo process and intensified after the Gaza disengagement. It…