This comprehensive document examines the impact of the "Iron Swords" conflict on Israeli military reservists, focusing on their motivation, commitment, and willingness to serve in a prolonged multi-front war. Based on a survey of 742 respondents conducted one month after the outbreak of hostilities, this analysis explores how the October 7th, 2023 attacks and subsequent military mobilization have affected reservists' perspectives on service, their confidence in achieving military objectives, and the socioeconomic factors influencing their continued participation.

1. Historical Context: The Unprecedented Nature of Iron Swords

The "Iron Swords" war represents a fundamental departure from Israel's previous military conflicts in both scale and nature. Unlike limited operations of recent decades, this conflict erupted following a catastrophic defensive failure that resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties and over 250 hostages taken on October 7th, 2023.

Gaza Front - Major ground operation against Hamas terrorist organization, requiring significant infantry and armored forces.

Northern Border - Ongoing conflict with Hezbollah terrorist organization launching rockets from Lebanon into Israeli territory.

Golan Heights - Confrontation with Shiite militias operating from Syria, requiring defensive deployments.

West Bank - Increased Palestinian terrorism requiring security operations and presence throughout the territory.Golan Heights

Houthis in Yemen - Launching missiles and rockets into Israel's rear, alongside an attempt for Naval Blockade

The Iranian connection - A comprehensive strategy of a "ring of fire" around Israel, with an emphasis on jihadist terrorism

The scale of reserve mobilization is unprecedented in the last half-century, with over 300,000 reservists called up immediately following the attacks. This multi-front war combines several challenging factors: the initial operational failure, multiple simultaneous theaters, prolonged combat operations, and high-intensity fighting. Together, these elements create a significant test for Israel's reserve forces, which have historically shown sensitivity to extended deployments, equipment quality issues, and battlefield achievements.

Israel's defense capabilities are now fundamentally dependent on reservists' determination and readiness to continue fighting for an extended period, both during active combat and in maintaining security lines afterward. This military necessity has profound economic and social implications that further affect reservists' willingness to serve.

2. Reserve Service Trends in the Last Decade (2013-2023)

Israel's reserve forces have undergone significant transformations since the 2006 Second Lebanon War, which ended with harsh criticism from reservists regarding their combat readiness, particularly concerning training frequency, combat equipment quality, and operational supplies.

Post-2006 Reform Period

Following the Second Lebanon War, the IDF implemented a multi-year reform program with substantial budget investments in reserve force combat readiness. During this period, research indicated significantly improved motivation among reservists, alongside higher trust levels in their commanders and units.

However, by 2012, budget cuts began affecting the IDF: reserve units were reduced in size, activation frequency decreased, and criticism regarding combat readiness re-emerged in subsequent years.

Recent Challenges (2019-2023)

The multi-front threat scenario developed gradually, with Iran establishing jihadist militias in countries surrounding Israel. By 2019, some analysts warned that the IDF, particularly its reserve component, was unprepared for such a scenario and that its manifestation could lead to a catastrophic situation where Israeli forces would struggle to counter these threats effectively.

The COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022) further complicated readiness, with significant reductions in reserve callups and training exercises. Simultaneously, Israeli society experienced political conflict resulting in six election cycles within three years and popular protests, some concerning the unequal distribution of reserve service burden.

2006 - Second Lebanon War ends with harsh criticism of reserve force readiness and equipment.

2007-2011 - Major reforms and investments in reserve forces lead to improved motivation and trust.

2012-2018 - Budget cuts reduce reserve unit size and activation frequency; combat readiness concerns resurface.

2019-2022 - COVID-19 pandemic severely reduces training; political conflicts lead to reservist protests and threats to refuse service.

Early 2023 - Formation of conservative-religious government with many non-serving members; social protests intensify.

October 7, 2023 - Hamas attack followed by unprecedented reserve mobilization for Operation Iron Swords.

The early 2023 establishment of a new government characterized by conservative, nationalist, and religious parties—with approximately half of its members having never served in the IDF—intensified social protests. This issue, combined with ongoing political conflicts and controversial legislation, amplified social demonstrations in which reservists threatened to withdraw their service commitment, with some announcing they would no longer report for duty.

3. Research Methodology and Participant Demographics

This study employed a semi-structured online questionnaire with 742 respondents, 77% of whom were reservists mobilized for Operation Iron Swords across all theaters and from more than 20 different units. The survey was distributed through social media one month after the war began, with responses collected via Google Forms. The data underwent both quantitative analysis and qualitative assessment from semi-structured questions.

This methodology enabled rapid access to a large, diverse sample without geographical limitations. Participants were asked to provide contact information for potential follow-up if the research continued.

Over 35% provided personal details—indicating high reliability and willingness among reservists to participate in research processes and have their voices heard through non-formal, primarily non-military frameworks.

Average Age - With an average of 7 years' experience in reserve service

Enlisted Personnel - While 24% were officers and 11% served in other capacities

Combat Roles - With 22% in combat support and 11% in rear echelon positions

Employed - Salaried employees, with 15% self-employed and 13% students

Geographic Distribution (%)

Research Limitations

The study did not survey two significant groups in Israeli society: the Ultra-Orthodox and Arab communities. Historically, the Arab community has demonstrated clear anti-war positions, while the Ultra-Orthodox community typically shows the opposite trend of spiritual support for war efforts, expressed through significant social volunteering.

Although these groups represent more than 30% of Israel's population, their effects on war-related attitudes may offset each other due to opposing perceptions. Additionally, since less than 0.5% of these communities serve in the IDF reserves, their exclusion does not significantly bias findings related to reserve service specifically.

4. Research Variables and Statistical Analysis

This study employed a comprehensive set of variables to analyze reservists' attitudes, experiences, and motivations during Operation Iron Swords. These variables covered demographics, military roles, and attitudinal measures regarding both the conflict and governmental support.

Correlation Analysis Findings

Geographic Correlations

A significant relationship exists between residents of peripheral/border areas and the perceived need for government economic assistance.

Military Role Impact

Combat soldiers show higher confidence in the ability to confront Hezbollah compared to other roles, and perceive a significant connection between combat equipment quality and ability to confront Hezbollah.

Experience Factor

Positive correlation between reserve service experience and confidence in the ability to defeat both Hamas and Hezbollah.

Officer Sensitivity

Officers demonstrate greater sensitivity to combat equipment quality issues than enlisted personnel.

Additional significant correlations revealed a strong and meaningful relationship between confidence in achieving decisive outcomes in both northern and southern theaters (success in one front correlates with confidence in success on the other). The motivation to continue service strongly depends on government assistance to reservists, while political tensions affect both trust and combat determination. Unit morale is influenced by government support for reservists and combat equipment quality.

5. Multiple Regression Analysis Results

The regression model examined the most influential variables affecting unit morale from the reservist's perspective, as well as reservists' willingness to continue fighting over an extended period. The model proved highly significant, highlighting several key aspects:

High Baseline Motivation

3.5/5 unconditional willingness to continue serving

Significant Influence Factors

Residential area, reserve experience, equipment quality, government support

Variable Ranking (Highest to Lowest Impact)

Government support, equipment quality, service experience, and residential area

Differences Between Employment Categories (Maximum Value 5)

These data indicate minimal variation between different sectors regarding morale and willingness to serve (both at high levels), with moderate satisfaction regarding government support for reservists.

Multiple Regression on Satisfaction with Government Support for Reservists

The regression model proved highly significant. The variables influencing satisfaction, ordered by magnitude of impact, were: attitude toward political change, equipment quality, and residential location.

It's important to emphasize that the residential location variable was significant but negative in its influence. This means that as participants lived closer to central Israel, their satisfaction with economic support for reservists decreased. Previous research has shown a significant correlation between residential location and socioeconomic status, with central residents belonging to upper economic deciles.

6. Qualitative Analysis of Open-Ended Responses

The analysis of free-text responses revealed important patterns in how reservists conceptualize the conflict and their role within it. These expressions help contextualize the quantitative findings and provide deeper insight into reservists' perspectives.

Military Objectives - Expectations for a "decisive victory" and dramatic changes in Gaza, such as demilitarization or destruction

Northern Front - References to "distancing Hezbollah from the border" appeared with moderate frequency as a required operational achievement on the northern border.

Hostages - The return of hostages received very high frequency mentions, perceived as a significant objective in this war.

National Unity - Expressions of "unity/brotherhood" appeared with high frequency, indicating great pride in the unity of the people.

Negative Sentiment Areas

• Government/Politicians: Very high frequency expressions of disappointment with political discourse, factionalism, and power struggles

  
  

• Media: High frequency of concerns about excessive focus on peripheral aspects of the war

  
  

• Economic Situation: Very high frequency discourse regarding necessary economic assistance

  
  

• Equipment: Low frequency mentions of shortages in basic equipment

  
  

Personal Concerns

• Family: Low frequency expressions of difficulty being away from family, concerns about family resilience

  
  

• Business/Work: Moderate frequency expressions of uncertainty and need for assistance

  
  

Notable Absences

Words not appearing in the discourse include: left, right, Netanyahu, defeat, Military Intelligence, IDF Chief of Staff, Palestinian Authority. This suggests political divisions have been temporarily suspended in the face of the immediate crisis.

7. Discussion of Findings

The research findings indicate that at the end of the second month of the war (when data collection occurred), reservists' confidence in the ability to achieve war objectives was high, particularly regarding the southern front. These findings are supported by high morale levels within units and willingness to continue serving in the reserves for an extended period to achieve these objectives.

Clarity of War Objectives

Reservists demonstrate a clear understanding of what the military operations aim to accomplish, creating a foundation for continued commitment.

Identification with Objectives

Strong personal alignment with the stated goals of the war, particularly regarding Hamas defeat and hostage return.

Perception of Accumulating Achievements

Sense that operational successes are building toward a definitive outcome, providing motivation to continue service.

The findings also indicate the influence of political discourse before and during the fighting, with significant variation based on reservists' residential areas and marked differences between central and peripheral regions. While residents of central Israel and nearby areas indicate lower satisfaction and dependence on political aspects, residents of border and conflict areas serving in the reserves demonstrate higher levels of identification, motivation, and confidence in the ability to achieve decisive victory.

Political stance, consistent with pre-war research, broadly affects many parameters. However, regarding the overall perspective of reservists, according to this study's participants, there is high willingness to continue serving.

Concerning reservists' "dual dilemmas" between unit versus family or employment/economic aspects, these appear to have less influence than might be expected. The family aspect has minimal impact, but the economic aspect is noticeable, with moderate satisfaction regarding economic assistance appearing among most serving personnel.

Equipment and Readiness

The equipment domain indicates a moderate level of unit readiness from reservists' perspective, with particularly negative perception among officers who feel their unit was less prepared than enlisted personnel perceive. In previous wars, equipment and readiness issues were very prominent in discourse during and after the conflict. However, in the current war, despite perceptions of mediocrity, equipment quality has a minor impact on the sense of achievement and confidence in the ability to achieve decisive victory.

8. The Two Israels: Center-Periphery Divide

Free-text analysis supports the quantitative findings and gives them clearer proportions. In this context, it is worth emphasizing that the level of identification with the ability to defeat Hamas and the need to return hostages receive intensive discourse among reservists, mainly under the context of value-based and achievable missions. The aspect of unity and cohesion also emerges clearly and positively. However, political and media discourse receives negative criticism from reservists, especially in contexts of engagement with issues that do not contribute to the war effort.

"First Israel" - Central Regions

• Higher socioeconomic status

• Less direct exposure to terror threats

• More critical of government support measures

• More influenced by political considerations

• Lower satisfaction with economic assistance

• Greater physical distance from conflict zones

  
  

"Second Israel" - Peripheral Regions

• More complex economic challenges

• Direct daily exposure to terror threats

• Higher identification with military objectives

• Stronger motivation and confidence in decisive victory

• Greater immediate stake in security outcomes

• More receptive to government support measures

  
  

Examining all findings, we can see that the motivation level of Israeli reservists to fight and defeat terrorist threats in Operation Iron Swords is very high and fundamentally unconditional. The data indicate that among reservists, the pre-war political discourse is almost non-existent. This issue is supported by the fact that keywords related to Israeli politics are almost absent from interviewees' responses.

This finding may indicate that the current campaign has a very moderating effect on social polarization based on political background.

However, residential area continues to be a significant factor influencing moods, which differ in certain dimensions between central Israeli residents and peripheral residents. This phenomenon recurs in numerous studies and serves to confirm a theory that developed in Israel over the past decade regarding differences between residential areas.

This theory holds that in practice, there are two societies in Israel: "First Israel," primarily central Israeli residents characterized by high socioeconomic ranking and little friction with terrorist threats, and "Second Israel," primarily peripheral residents who deal more complexly with economic issues and are directly exposed to daily terrorist threats. This phenomenon may constitute the line of polarization in Israeli society in the current era.

9. Conclusions and Recommendations

Research findings indicate that Israel can rely on its reserve forces for an extended period, primarily due to the clarity of war objectives and identification with them, including the perceived ability to achieve them. These findings are highly significant at a point when the war is extending far beyond Israel's past conflicts. Reservists clearly accept this, are willing to be part of the decisive effort, and feel this effort is bearing fruit with objectives achievable with high probability.

Continue Emphasizing Operational Achievements

The IDF and Israeli government should maintain focus on communicating how individual military successes contribute to overall strategic objectives, reinforcing reservists' sense of purpose and progress.

Enhance Economic Support for Reservists

Improve economic assistance programs for serving personnel, with clear communication about available benefits and broad publicity to ensure awareness and appreciation.

Maintain Readiness and Equipment Quality

Preserve combat readiness levels and logistics for handling combat equipment, addressing officers' concerns about preparation and ensuring consistent quality across units.

Foster Unifying Political Discourse

Create a more unifying atmosphere in political discourse and reduce conversation around secondary aspects that distract from war efforts or create unnecessary divisions.

The question of "First Israel" and "Second Israel" should be on the research agenda. In the past, social rifts in Israel stemmed mainly from national and ethno-cultural contexts, while in the last decade, as mentioned, the line of division may be geographical, primarily socioeconomic. This issue requires further examination, followed by the question: Does a national catastrophe like what occurred on October 7th, 2023, in Israel constitute a positive accelerator for the cohesion of Israeli society?

This research shows that despite pre-war political divisions and threats to refuse service, Israeli reservists have demonstrated extraordinary commitment following the October 7th attacks. Their willingness to serve for extended periods, high morale, and confidence in achieving military objectives suggest that existential threats may temporarily bridge societal divisions, though the center-periphery divide remains a significant factor in how reservists perceive both the conflict and government support.

Future research should explore how the unprecedented mobilization and shared experience of this conflict might reshape Israeli civil-military relations in the long term, particularly whether the current unity among reservists translates to broader social cohesion once immediate security threats diminish.