This document examines the impact of the "Iron Swords" War (beginning October 7, 2023) on the motivation of Israeli youth to serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Through longitudinal research spanning the past decade, with a particular focus on recent developments, we analyse how this unprecedented conflict has affected national identity, threat perception, and service motivation among young Israelis aged 15-19. The research reveals significant trends in youth attitudes toward military service, the influence of family background, religious beliefs, and geographical factors, all within the context of Israel's evolving security challenges and societal debates about mandatory service. Combining data from multiple research waves with the latest findings from April 2024, this analysis provides crucial insights into how the current conflict is reshaping youth perspectives on military service and national identity.

1. Introduction: The Unique Context of the "Iron Swords" War

Throughout Israel's brief history, wars have typically stimulated significant recruitment among youth, particularly for combat roles. However, since the early 2000s, motivation for IDF service has fluctuated, with the impact of military conflicts varying over time. Between major conflicts, the warrior ethos tends to fade, with military confrontations taking the form of targeted operations—many involving intelligence, firepower, air forces, and special units.

The "Iron Swords" War, which began on 7 October 2023, represents a profound departure from previous conflicts in Israel's recent history. It constitutes a strategic surprise and military failure, after which many fell in heroic battles of "few against many," including literal fights for home and hearth. The IDF launched a decisive ground manoeuvre in Gaza and found itself in a multi-front conflict unlike any seen before. For the first time in many years, a sense of existential threat emerged even among those who had not felt it in the past decade, alongside the decisive objective declared at the outbreak of war.

Strategic Surprise

The October 7 attacks represented an unprecedented intelligence and military failure, leading to a fundamental reassessment of Israel's security doctrine.

Multi-Front Conflict

Unlike previous operations, the IDF has found itself fighting simultaneously in Gaza, the northern border, and addressing threats from more distant fronts.

Existential Threat Perception

The nature and scale of the October 7 attacks reawakened feelings of existential vulnerability across Israeli society, including among those who previously felt secure.

One can assess that Israeli society is at a defining moment in cultural, social, and military contexts. As IDF forces engage in direct combat across more than three fronts, the military requires regular and reserve manpower resources to provide sustained operational responses over time. In research conducted in November 2023 on motivation for reserve service, we found significant data highlighting reservists' willingness to serve until the war's decisive phase and in subsequent security operations—despite the burdens. However, the motivational picture among youth approaching mandatory service requires ongoing examination.

This current research follows up on studies conducted in August 2023, which attempted to gauge the processes affecting youth regarding service motivation. At that time, we identified trends in threat perception, influencing social conflicts, gender issues, and value tensions between liberal and conservative segments of society against the backdrop of judicial reform conflict. The outbreak of war in October provides an opportunity to examine whether these trends have accelerated or shifted in response to the new security reality.

2. Research Methodology and Participant Demographics

This study represents the fourth wave in a decade-long sampling of Israeli youth, forming a significant milestone in understanding trends affecting young people and the impact of the "Iron Swords" War. Based on metrics designed in the longitudinal questionnaire, we compared effects across variables through four different periods: 2015-2017, 2018-2021, 2022-2023, and 2024.

Research Design

Our research employs a comparative, quantitative, longitudinal examination focusing on the 15-19 age group. The study is distributed through social networks using a validated questionnaire that has been completed by 4,000 young people over the past decade. Data collection is based on self-reporting in a questionnaire covering several examination clusters: national-liberal ethos, perception of security threats, family influences, and socioeconomic and geographical impacts.

The questionnaire was distributed via social networks and using the "snowball" method, allowing us to reach diverse segments of Israeli youth. This approach enables us to track changes in attitudes over time, with particular attention to shifts that may have occurred following the October 7 attacks and subsequent war.

The study's longitudinal approach allows for meaningful comparisons across different time periods, helping identify trends and shifts in youth attitudes toward military service, especially in the wake of the "Iron Swords" War.

Participant Demographics

Geographical Distribution

• 23% Centre

• 29% Near Periphery

• 30% Far Periphery

• 18% Border Regions

  
  

Gender Distribution

• 42% Women

• 58% Men

  
  

Religious Affiliation

• 11% Anti-religious

• 32% Secular

• 22% Traditional

• 29% Religious

• 6% Religious-Haredi

  
  

Ethnic Distribution

• 92% Jewish

• 6% Druze

• 2% Arab

  
  

The sample demographics provide a reasonably representative cross-section of Israeli youth across different regions, religious backgrounds, and gender distributions. This diversity allows us to examine how different segments of Israeli society are responding to the current conflict and how their attitudes toward military service may be changing as a result. The predominance of Jewish respondents (92%) reflects the focus on attitudes toward service in the IDF, which is primarily mandatory for Jewish citizens.

The geographical distribution is particularly significant for our analysis, as it allows us to examine how proximity to conflict zones may influence threat perception and service motivation. Similarly, the religious distribution enables analysis of how different levels of religious observance correlate with attitudes toward national service and defense.

3. National Identity and Liberal Values Among Israeli Youth

The definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state presents numerous value conflicts, yet some argue these are not opposing values but rather a "value set" that doesn't sum to zero. In this context, it's worth emphasising that nationalism is not necessarily "ultra-nationalism," just as liberalism is not necessarily "progressivism." Data from the past decade indicate an upward trend in national identification among young people alongside the preservation of liberal values—a phenomenon that confirms the claim that such values are not a "zero-sum game."

The consistent trend over the past decade shows that Israeli youth have strengthened in their national perceptions while not weakening in their liberal outlook—this is certainly not "blind" patriotism, but rather constructive-social patriotism. The statements to which participants were asked to respond that have national characteristics address issues of state identity, including national symbols, Jerusalem's status, national holidays, and more.

It is evident that young people in the research age group increasingly support national statements, such as sovereignty over Greater (unified) Jerusalem, the importance of the Memorial Day for IDF casualties, and the centrality of the IDF's status in Israeli society. These are contexts that in the Western world have been eroded due to post-modernist trends, but in Israel, it is apparent that not only are they preserved, but the level of identification with them is strengthening, consistently as mentioned.

"In contrast to global trends where national identities have weakened under post-modernist influences, Israeli youth demonstrate increasing identification with national symbols, holidays, and institutions—particularly regarding Jerusalem's status and the centrality of the IDF in society."

What's particularly striking in the April 2024 data is the sharp increase in national identity markers following the October 7 attacks and subsequent war. The score of 5.2 (on a 1-6 scale) represents the highest level of national identification measured in our decade-long study. Importantly, this has not come at the expense of liberal values, which remain relatively stable at 4.1, challenging the notion that increased nationalism necessarily diminishes liberal democratic commitments.

This trend suggests that Israeli youth are developing a complex civic identity that combines strong national attachment with preservation of liberal democratic values—a combination that may be particularly adaptive in Israel's security context. Rather than adopting an exclusionary form of nationalism, these findings indicate a form of "constructive patriotism" that acknowledges both national security needs and democratic principles.

4. Threat Perception and Security Awareness

Another consistent finding over the past decade with an impact on social perceptions is the level of perceived threat among young people. In the past, we observed that young people identify a higher level of security threat compared to those who have completed military service. Nevertheless, the perceived threat level among youth is also on an upward trend.

Examining the numbers, these are indeed small figures—on a scale of 1-6, the base threat level doesn't drop below 4. However, in recent years, threat perception has changed—comparing April 2024 to June 2019 shows a significant fluctuation in how youth identify the threat level, which is a weighted calculation of fears of all-out war, levels of antisemitism, and terrorist threats. It's worth noting that in 2019, when young people rated the threat level at 4.52 out of 6, military veterans (average age 23) rated the threat level at 3.83.

Young people's understanding of security needs is also significant and persistent against cutting defence budgets, but not only that; this age group is strengthening in consensus around the danger posed by the idea of a Palestinian state, the vulnerability of protesting against the establishment during wartime, and what they see as overly liberal treatment of terrorists.

Existential Threat Perception

April 2024 data shows the highest level of security threat perception (5.25 on a 1-6 scale) recorded in our decade-long study, representing a significant increase following the October 7 attacks.

Geographical Influence Diminishing

Unlike previous periods where proximity to border regions significantly affected threat perception, April 2024 data shows no significant correlation between residential area and threat perception—the sense of vulnerability has become more universally distributed across Israeli society.

Youth vs Veterans

Young people consistently perceive higher threat levels than military veterans. This disparity has persisted across our research waves but has narrowed following the October 7 attacks as threat perception has risen across all demographic groups.

Security Policy Preferences

Increased threat perception correlates with stronger opposition to defence budget cuts, greater skepticism toward the concept of a Palestinian state, and concerns about civilian protests during wartime.

The significant increase in threat perception observed in the April 2024 data (5.25 on a 1-6 scale) represents the highest level recorded in our decade-long study. This dramatic rise reflects the profound psychological impact of the October 7 attacks and subsequent war on Israeli youth. What's particularly notable is the universality of this increased threat perception—unlike previous periods where proximity to conflict zones significantly influenced perceptions, the April 2024 data shows that youth across all regions of Israel now share similarly high levels of security concern.

This heightened threat awareness appears to be influencing policy preferences among Israeli youth, with strong opposition to defence budget cuts and increased skepticism toward diplomatic solutions that might be perceived as compromising security. The data suggests that the "Iron Swords" War has fundamentally altered how young Israelis perceive their security environment, with potential long-term implications for their attitudes toward military service and national security policies.

5. Motivation for Combat Service: Trends and Influences

It is not unlikely that the insights above influence the motivations of young people in choosing their type of military service. A growing trend can be identified over the past decade regarding service in combat roles preferred by men (less so by women). The latest wave in April 2024 shows a sharp increase in motivation for service as combat soldiers—this is a natural increase following war, but it's also a continuing trend. It should be noted that the change comes at the expense of motivation to serve in combat-support roles.

Combat Roles

April 2024: 68% of male respondent's express preference for combat roles, up from 58% in August 2023. Among female respondents, preference rose from 22% to 29%.

Combat Support

April 2024: 15% of male respondents prefer combat support roles, down from 23% in August 2023. Female preference remained stable at approximately 31%.

Technology Units

April 2024: 12% of male respondents prefer technological roles, down from 14% in August 2023. Among females, preference decreased from 28% to 24%.

Administrative/Support

April 2024: 5% of male respondents prefer administrative roles, down from 5% in August 2023. Female preference decreased from 19% to 16%.

The April 2024 data reveals a significant shift in service preferences following the outbreak of the "Iron Swords" War. The most dramatic change is observed in the preference for combat roles among male respondents, which increased from 58% in August 2023 to 68% in April 2024. This 10-percentage-point increase represents the largest single-period jump in our decade-long study and clearly demonstrates the war's impact on service motivation.

Notably, female respondents also showed increased interest in combat roles, rising from 22% to 29%. This shift is particularly significant given the gender disparities in combat service preferences that have persisted throughout our research. The trend suggests that while gender remains a strong predictor of service preferences, the "Iron Swords" War has motivated young women to consider combat roles at unprecedented rates.

The increased interest in combat roles has primarily come at the expense of combat support and technological positions, indicating that youth are specifically drawn to direct fighting roles rather than supporting functions. This shift aligns with historical patterns where existential threats tend to drive interest in frontline service, but the magnitude of the change is exceptional.

A particularly notable finding from our research is that 72% of study participants who had at least one parent serving in the current campaign (in reserves) indicated that they participate in youth movements. This aspect may serve as a test point for the role of youth movements, the pillar on which they rely, and the connection between reserve service and mandatory service, both in the general social context and following the family context.

6. Correlation Analysis: Key Factors Influencing Service Motivation

Our research has identified several significant correlations between demographic factors, family background, and service motivation among Israeli youth. These correlations help explain the patterns observed in service preferences and provide insights into the complex interplay of factors that shape attitudes toward military service.

Religious Observance

Positive correlation between level of tradition/religiosity and motivation for combat service. More religious youth consistently express higher interest in frontline combat roles.

Parental Influence

Positive correlation between parents' military service type and their children's service preferences. Combat veterans' children are significantly more likely to choose combat roles.

Geographic Location

Correlation between residential area and service motivation (increasing with distance from the centre). Youth from peripheral and border regions show higher combat motivation.

Additional Significant Correlations

• Negative correlation between education level and perceived security threat

• As one approaches the periphery/border, the security threat level is perceived as more severe

• Positive correlation between the mother's service type and level of community volunteering

• Men's motivation to enlist in combat units is higher than women's

  
  

Among these correlations, there exists another correlation, perhaps the most significant of all—in the Israeli family, there is a clear and significant connection between the father's mandatory service and the mother's service. Combined with the fact that, as mentioned, parental influences on their children in this context are significant, it can be estimated with high certainty that the Israeli family in the past decade in general, and at this time in particular, is a mobilised family.

Further evidence is the fact that over 70% of participants in the 2024 wave testify that at least one figure from the nuclear family served in the "Iron Swords" War, and 20% claim that two figures from the nuclear family served in the current war.

Impact Ranking of Variables

Following the examination of correlations between variables, we also examined the relative strength of influence of each variable on motivation for service in the IDF, or in other words, the ranking of variables' influence in a multi-variable regression, where variables are isolated and examined relatively and generally.

Gender

The strongest predictor of service preferences, with male respondents significantly more likely to prefer combat roles.

Religious Level

The second most influential factor, with more religious youth showing greater combat motivation.

Residential Area

Geographic location significantly influences service preferences, with peripheral areas showing higher combat motivation.

Parental Service

Parents' type of military service strongly influences children's service preferences and motivation.

The order of influence of variables in the regression including the April 2024 wave shows consistency in the level of significant influence (from high to low): gender, level of religiosity, residential area, parents' type of mandatory service. However, there is no significant influence of the family's socio-economic status in the context of motivation for service in the IDF, nor is there a significant periodic influence of threat perception. The implication is that in the current variable model, the most influential factors are the family environment and residential area.

7. Compulsory Service Model in the Israeli Context

The compulsory service model in the IDF has been subject to intensifying debate in Israeli society over the past decade. Opposing a traditional view that mandatory service has positive effects in both security and social contexts, some argue that the reality where only about 50% of Israeli youth complete mandatory service creates social tensions, especially around the perception of increasing inequality in bearing the burden.

The Debate Over Israel's Military Service Model

These social tensions also develop in gender contexts and in contexts of religion and state, and it is evident that they serve as a platform for polarisation and division in Israeli society. Because of this, there are perceptions that argue that the "people's army" model in Israel should be shelved, and a professional-voluntary service should be preferred.

While debate continues around the IDF service model, culminating in the conscription law that is in constitutional and parliamentary dispute, the events of October 7, 2023, constitute a significant test point for youth motivation regarding service in the IDF—youth who in the current generation have been labelled as the "screen generation," "TikTok" and a host of other titles that create a consciousness as if this is a generation that prefers the keyboard to weapons, the technological environment over the field environment. 

The events of October 7, 2023, may be a turning point in everything related to Israeli society's perception of youth and youth perception of military service—the uniqueness of the October 2023 events, emphasising the embodiment of an existential threat alongside the vitality of military operational capability in field ranks, may serve as a catalyst in the service motivation of young people, beyond the motivations that characterise any war period.

Traditional "People's Army" Model

• Universal conscription creating shared national experience

• Military service as social integration mechanism

• Security needs requiring large standing force

• Historical connection to nation-building narrative

  
  

Reform Arguments

• Only ~50% of eligible youth complete full service

• Unequal burden distribution causing social tensions

• Gender and religious exemption controversies

• Efficiency arguments for professional force

  
  

Impact of "Iron Swords" War

• Renewed emphasis on need for large ground forces

• Existential threat perception strengthening traditional model

• Potential opportunity for Haredi integration

• Shift in youth perception of military necessity

  
  

Moreover, under the prevailing perception that not only will 2024 be a "year of war," but that we are facing dramatic years in contexts of direct confrontation with Iran, the realisation of the Hezbollah threat, as well as various regional threats, it may be that in the cognitive context, the October 2023 war is not a point catalyst as in any war in terms of motivation, but a deep social internalisation regarding the security needs that Israeli society requires in the foreseeable future, things that do not correspond with slogans such as "small and strong army."

In this context, some see this war as an opportunity for more meaningful integration of recruits from the Haredi society, where for years attempts to enhance recruitment from its sources have not matured to significant momentum.

"The uniqueness of the 'Iron Swords' War presents an opportunity for continued longitudinal examination of service motivations in the IDF, and possible development directions, including examination regarding possible changes in the Israeli ethos—between our being a conservative society or a liberal society."

Major events in social contexts can be perception-changing, certainly when it comes to youth who are in the final stage of maturity and adulthood—those youth whom the education system avoids confronting with the regional geo-political situation, the security risks on the agenda, and in general, avoids dealing with contexts of national security as a basic fulcrum for motivation of security service for the people and the state.

8. Research Findings: National Identity and Security Perceptions

The most striking finding from our April 2024 research wave is the continued strengthening of national identity markers among Israeli youth, a trend that has accelerated following the October 7 attacks. This is complemented by increased security threat perception and growing motivation for combat service, particularly among male respondents.

Family Military Connection

Percentage of respondents with at least one immediate family member serving in the current war effort, highlighting the deeply interconnected nature of Israeli society and military service.

Combat Preference

Percentage of male respondents expressing preference for combat roles in April 2024, representing a 10-point increase from pre-war levels and the highest recorded in our decade-long study.

Threat Perception

Average score (on 1-6 scale) of perceived security threat in April 2024, significantly higher than the 4.8 recorded in August 2023 before the war began.

It is important to note that in the April 2024 wave, the strength of the looming threat is not significant in contexts of residential area as in the past, that is, if in the past as residence was in the periphery, the perceived threat level was higher with a significance of over 99%, in the April 2024 wave there is no significant connection between these variables. Moreover, the significance of the intercept in the regression also requires attention—according to this model, the level of motivation for service in the IDF on a scale of 1-6 stands at its base at 3.82, and on top of that, as mentioned, the significant influences are added.

One can say that before we enter into variables of environment and family, the basic level of willingness for meaningful service in the IDF is high, and this may indicate the fundamental perceptual state in which youth find themselves in this context. This base level of motivation appears to have remained relatively stable across our research waves, suggesting that environmental and demographic factors are influencing variations rather than fundamentally altering basic attitudes toward service.

The data reveal significant shifts across all key metrics following the outbreak of the "Iron Swords" War. National identity markers increased from 4.8 to 5.2 on our 6-point scale, while threat perception rose dramatically from 4.8 to 5.25. Combat motivation saw particularly notable increases, with a 10-percentage-point jump among male respondents and a 7-point increase among females.

What's particularly notable is that liberal values remained stable despite the increases in national identity and security concerns. This challenges the assumption that increased nationalism necessarily comes at the expense of liberal democratic values, suggesting instead that Israeli youth are developing a more complex civic identity that incorporates both strong national attachment and liberal democratic commitments.

9. Conclusions and Future Research Directions

The "Iron Swords" War is definitively influencing Israeli youth, particularly in contexts of national identity, threat perception, and motivation for service in the IDF. It is worth emphasising that the longitudinal research presents a consistent trend in these aspects, but the October events are certainly a catalyst for enhancing processes that need to be identified in the longer term.

Key Finding 1: Family Influence

The research highlights the resilience of the Israeli family, its internal influences, and the significance of parental service impacts on their children's perception of service. Family remains the strongest predictor of service attitudes, with parental military experience directly influencing youth motivation.

Key Finding 2: National Identity

There has been a consistent strengthening of national identity markers among Israeli youth over the past decade, accelerated by the October 7 attacks. Importantly, this has not come at the expense of liberal democratic values, challenging zero-sum assumptions about nationalism and liberalism.

Key Finding 3: Threat Perception

Security threat perception has risen significantly following the "Iron Swords" War, reaching the highest levels recorded in our decade-long study. Unlike previous periods, this increased threat perception is now consistent across all geographic regions of Israel.

In this context, it is worth highlighting an additional data point—72% of research participants with at least one parent who served in the current campaign (in reserves) indicate that they take part in youth movements. This aspect may serve as a test point for the role of youth movements, the pillar on which they rely, and the connection between reserve service and mandatory service, both in the general social context following the family context.

The central question remaining at the conclusion of this research concerns the continuity of the described trends—will they be preserved? And above all, is a security catastrophe precisely the exclusive engine for cohesion and resilience in Israeli society? While the "Iron Swords" War has clearly galvanized Israeli youth and strengthened their commitment to national service, the long-term sustainability of these trends remains an open question.

"The response of Israeli youth to the October 7 attacks and subsequent war suggests a fundamental reassessment of security realities among a generation previously characterized as digitally focused and disconnected from traditional security concerns. Their increased willingness to serve in combat roles indicates that when faced with existential threats, even the so-called 'screen generation' prioritizes national defense over technological comfort."

Future research should focus on whether the trends observed in April 2024 will persist as the immediate shock of the October 7 attacks recedes. Will the increased motivation for combat service remain elevated, or will it gradually return to pre-war levels? Similarly, will the strengthened national identity markers continue to coexist with liberal democratic values, or will tensions emerge as the security situation evolves?

Another critical area for future investigation is the potential impact of the "Iron Swords" War on Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) recruitment. The existential nature of the current conflict presents a unique opportunity to address the long-standing tensions surrounding unequal service burdens. Research should examine whether the war has shifted attitudes within the Haredi community toward military service and whether institutional changes might facilitate greater integration.

Ultimately, the research raises profound questions about the foundations of Israeli social cohesion and the role of security threats in shaping national identity. While the "Iron Swords" War has clearly strengthened commitment to military service among Israeli youth, the challenge for Israeli society is to sustain social solidarity even in the absence of immediate existential threats.