This comprehensive analysis examines how the October 7th attacks and subsequent Iron Swords War have influenced Israeli public opinion regarding the potential resettlement of territories evacuated during the 2005 Disengagement. Based on survey data from 712 Israeli citizens collected in March 2024, this document explores attitudes toward security needs, Palestinian statehood, and the strategic value of settlements in Gaza and northern Samaria. The findings reveal significant shifts in Israeli public opinion, with over 70% now viewing the 2005 Disengagement as a mistake and more than 50% supporting resettlement in some evacuated areas.

1. The October 7th Turning Point and Israel's Strategic Reality

The October 7th, 2023 attacks represent a profound breaking point in Israeli society and have reignited debates about rebuilding of Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip. The idea of resettlement never fully disappeared after the 2005 Disengagement, which was marketed to Israeli society as a strategic improvement but instead created deep national and social divisions. Looking back after 19 years, the evacuation of settlements in Gaza (the Northern Security Zone, Netzarim enclave, Gush Katif, and Rafah approaches) as well as northern Samaria, appears to have deteriorated Israel's strategic position rather than improving it. The security situation has worsened, and social cohesion has declined significantly.

The Palestinian side openly declares its murderous intentions and commits acts that constitute crimes against humanity in order to eliminate the Jewish state, while much of the Israeli side remains in a defensive posture of "containment."

When the ground operation in Gaza began in late October 2023, discourse about reestablishing evacuated settlements reemerged. While mainstream media and segments of society dismiss this thinking as completely delusional, from a strategic perspective it deserves examination - including understanding the general public support for the idea, especially among those who have experienced the operational reality on the ground.

Each settlement area had different implications - the northern Gaza security zone and northern Samaria settlements, for instance, versus enclaves like Netzarim. Each settlement zone required different resource allocations, particularly regarding security, and the settlements themselves contributed differently to settlement and security logic.

2. Research Methodology and Demographics

Research Question

How has the war in Gaza and the West Bank influenced attitudes toward resettlement in areas evacuated in 2005?

Methodology

Distribution of a semi-structured online questionnaire among populations aged 18-60, representing the three central age layers targeted for examination.

Analysis

Analysis of findings based on correlations and multiple variable regression; analysis of general text responses; discussion of findings and drawing conclusions regarding attitudes in Israeli society.

During March 2024, 712 citizens within the target age groups participated in the interactive questionnaire. The geographical distribution represented the research conducted in the past two years regarding Israeli public opinions on national security issues:

The average age of research participants was 46 years. 31% were mobilized during the current war, with 28% serving in the Gaza Strip, 32% on the northern border, 23% in the West Bank sector, and 17% in home front and other roles. 302 respondents left contact information for follow-up in-depth research studies. This methodological approach ensures a representative sample across geographic regions, age groups, and military service experience, providing a comprehensive view of Israeli attitudes toward resettlement following the October 7th attacks.

4. Perceptions of "Total Victory" and Security Needs (% support)

The question of "total victory" against Hamas receives a perception in the public that includes four main parameters: destruction of the military wing and demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, elimination of Hamas leaders wherever they are, return of all hostages, and sealing the Gaza-Rafah border. Additionally, 51% believe the IDF should operate in the Gaza Strip even after the war ends. These percentages represent a broad consensus in Israeli society regarding the security outcome that constitutes "total victory." The Israeli public has developed clear metrics for what would represent success in the current conflict, with security considerations predominating in their thinking about post-war arrangements.

Security Through Military Presence

51% believe the IDF should maintain an operational presence in Gaza even after the conclusion of formal hostilities, indicating a preference for direct security control rather than relying on agreements or third parties.

Border Control as Essential

82% view sealing the Gaza-Rafah border as a critical component of victory, reflecting concerns about weapons smuggling and terrorist movement that contributed to the October 7th attacks.

Permanent Solutions Required

The high percentages across all metrics suggest Israelis are seeking durable solutions rather than temporary arrangements, with most believing that only complete elimination of Hamas can provide lasting security.

This consensus reflects a significant shift in Israeli thinking about security arrangements in Gaza. Following nearly two decades of various security approaches after the 2005 Disengagement, the October 7th attacks have crystallized public opinion around the need for more direct control measures. The preference for continued IDF presence indicates decreasing faith in deterrence-only strategies or reliance on international monitors or Palestinian security forces.

5. The 2005 Disengagement in Retrospect

In terms of settlement and security aspects, according to this research, over 70% believe that the 2005 disengagement from Gaza was a mistake. This represents a dramatic reassessment of what was, at the time, a deeply divisive policy that resulted in the evacuation of approximately 8,500 Israeli settlers from Gaza and the dismantling of 21 settlements.

The findings indicate that the vast majority of Israelis now view the 2005 Disengagement as a strategic error that worsened Israel's security situation rather than improving it.

The reassessment crosses political and demographic lines, with strong majorities in all regions of Israel expressing the belief that the withdrawal was misguided. This perspective has solidified particularly after October 7th, when Hamas launched its attack from the very territories Israel had evacuated.

Settlements as Security Assets

Over 80% of respondents believe that settlements (including those beyond the Green Line) constitute an essential part of Israel's security needs. This represents a profound shift in how settlements are perceived - no longer primarily as ideological projects but as strategic security assets that provide territorial depth, intelligence gathering capabilities, and a buffer zone against attacks.

Evacuation Consequences

Many Israelis now view the 2005 evacuation of settlements as having created a security vacuum that enabled Hamas to build tunnels and military infrastructure used in the October 7th attacks. The settlements are retrospectively seen as providing crucial security that was lost.

This widespread reassessment of the 2005 Disengagement represents one of the most significant shifts in Israeli public opinion in recent decades. What was once viewed by many as a necessary sacrifice for peace or demographic security is now seen as a strategic blunder that removed an essential security layer and emboldened Israel's enemies.

6. Palestinian Statehood as a Perceived Existential Threat

The research reveals a dramatic increase in the percentage of Israelis who view a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an existential threat to the State of Israel. In August 2023, prior to the October 7th attacks, 62% held this view. By March 2024, this figure had risen to 79% - a 17 percentage point increase in just seven months. This significant shift reflects how the October 7th attacks have fundamentally altered Israeli perceptions of the risks associated with Palestinian sovereignty. The attacks, launched from Gaza after Israel's complete withdrawal, have served as a powerful cautionary tale about what could potentially happen in the West Bank if Israel were to withdraw from that territory as well.

Security Concerns

The substantial increase in those viewing a Palestinian state as an existential threat stems from fears that such a state would become a launching pad for attacks against Israel's population centers, much as Gaza did after the 2005 withdrawal.

Geographic Proximity

Unlike Gaza, the West Bank directly borders Israel's major population centers and strategic infrastructure. A hostile entity in this territory would place millions of Israelis within range of the types of attacks seen on October 7th.

Governance Concerns

The collapse of Palestinian Authority governance in parts of the West Bank and the growing influence of Hamas and other militant groups have heightened concerns that any Palestinian state would quickly fall under the control of extremist elements.

This shift in public opinion has significant implications for Israeli policy and peace negotiations. With nearly 80% of Israelis now viewing a Palestinian state as an existential threat, political support for territorial concessions or a two-state solution has diminished substantially. The research suggests that the October 7th attacks have fundamentally altered the risk calculation for most Israelis regarding territorial control and sovereignty over disputed lands.

7. Public Support for Resettlement in Evacuated Areas

On the question of resettlement in areas evacuated in 2005, research participants demonstrate a very clear perception that at least some of the settlements evacuated during the Disengagement should be reestablished:

The findings indicate that over 50% support resettlement in northern Samaria and northern Gaza Strip, and close to 50% believe that at least some of the settlements in Gush Katif should be renewed. When examining the characteristics of those supporting resettlement, the findings indicate that they do not differ substantially between the types of participating population, ages, military service, and place of residence.

Nearly 40% of residents in central Israel believe it is right to reestablish settlements in northern Samaria and northern Gaza Strip, and approximately 30% support the reestablishment of Gush Katif settlements.

2005 Disengagement - Evacuation of all Gaza settlements and four settlements in northern Samaria viewed as a strategic measure for peace.

2007-2023 - Hamas takes control of Gaza; multiple rounds of conflict; growing skepticism about disengagement benefits.

October 7, 2023 - Hamas attacks Israel from Gaza, killing 1,200 and taking hostages, triggering a fundamental reassessment of the 2005 withdrawal.

March 2024 - Research shows majority support for resettlement in some evacuated areas, reflecting changed security perceptions.

It is worth noting that in previous studies, we found that residents of central Israel are generally characterized by lower support compared to others regarding settlement beyond the Green Line. Thus, the findings of this study represent a shift in attitudes regarding settlement and security contexts. This suggests that the October 7th attacks have reshaped opinions even among demographic groups that traditionally opposed settlement expansion.

8. Correlation Analysis: Demographics and Attitudes

War Participation & Disengagement Views

A positive correlation was found between participation in the war and a negative attitude toward the 2005 Disengagement. Those who served during the current conflict were significantly more likely to view the 2005 withdrawal as a mistake, suggesting direct military experience influences historical assessments.

War Participation & Palestinian State Perceptions

A positive correlation exists between participation in the war and viewing a Palestinian state as an existential threat to Israel. Military personnel who experienced combat operations appear to have developed stronger security concerns about Palestinian sovereignty.

Geographic Distance Effect

As the place of residence moves away from the center, all correlations become stronger in their effect. Residents of peripheral areas and especially those near borders show stronger correlations between all variables, suggesting proximity to conflict zones intensifies security concerns.

War Participation & Resettlement Support

No significant correlation was found between participation in the war, including fighting in Gaza, and principled support for establishing settlements in northern Samaria and/or Gaza Strip. Military service does not appear to significantly influence attitudes toward resettlement.

Age Factors & Resettlement Views

No correlation exists between age layers and intergenerational position and support for renewed settlement. Generation Z, Millennials, and Generation X all show similar patterns in their attitudes toward resettlement, suggesting this is not a generational issue.

A regression model examining the influence on support for resettlement was found to be significant at the 99% level:

Baseline Support

The intercept is significant, which may indicate that the basic attitude toward reestablishing settlements is positive, regardless of other variables. This suggests a fundamental shift in Israeli thinking about territorial control after October 7th.

Geographic Influence

The "place of residence" variable has a significant positive effect on support for the number of settlements to be established. Those living farther from central Israel are more likely to support extensive resettlement efforts.

Military Service Factor

The variable "service in the war" is not significant in influencing the attitude toward resettlement. This contradicts assumptions that military personnel would have stronger views on settlement policy based on operational experiences.

These correlations and regression analysis provide important nuance to understanding how different factors influence Israeli attitudes toward resettlement. While geographic location remains a significant predictor of settlement support, the lack of correlation with military service or age suggests that views on resettlement cut across these demographic divisions, indicating a broader societal shift rather than one limited to specific groups.

9. Security Control Without Settlements: Alternative Views

Military Control Preference

Among those who do not see a need to reestablish settlements, approximately 50% believe the IDF should operate from these areas. This represents a significant portion of settlement opponents who nevertheless favor Israeli security control.

Alternative Security Measures

Some respondents suggested enhanced border barriers, remote surveillance technologies, and periodic security operations as alternatives to permanent settlements, believing these could provide security without the political complications of civilian presence.

International Involvement

A minority favored international security guarantees or multinational forces as an alternative to both IDF presence and settlements, though support for such arrangements has declined significantly following the perceived failures of UNIFIL in Lebanon and other peacekeeping missions.

This finding highlights an important distinction in Israeli security thinking: even among those who oppose civilian resettlement for political, diplomatic, or practical reasons, there remains strong support for maintaining Israeli security control over evacuated territories. The research suggests that regardless of settlement policy, the majority of Israeli society believes Israel must maintain security control over the territory.

Security Without Settlement

For this segment of respondents, permanent military bases, security zones, or regular military operations represent a preferable alternative to civilian settlements. They believe this approach would provide the necessary security control while avoiding the international criticism and internal resource allocation associated with civilian settlements.

Pragmatic Considerations

Some opposition to resettlement stems not from ideological objections but from practical concerns about the cost, security requirements, and international diplomatic consequences of reestablishing civilian communities in hostile territories. These respondents still prioritize security control but prefer it be implemented through military rather than civilian means.

The implications of these findings suggest that while debate exists about the form Israeli presence should take in evacuated territories, there is broad consensus across the political spectrum that some form of Israeli security control is necessary. This represents a significant narrowing of the policy debate from whether Israel should control these territories to how that control should be implemented.

10. Conclusions and Strategic Implications

The findings of this research indicate a significant change of over 15% compared to August 2023 in negative attitudes regarding a Palestinian state and positive attitudes toward resettlement in places evacuated in 2005, without substantial difference in aspects of residential area, age, or participation in the current war.

Security-Settlement Nexus

It is evident that the Israeli public generally sees vitality in the connection between settlement and security. The October 7th attacks have reinforced the perception that territorial presence through settlements provides a security buffer that cannot be replaced by technology or agreements alone.

Reassessment of Past Concessions

The overwhelming majority now views the 2005 Disengagement as a strategic error, indicating a fundamental reassessment of land-for-peace or unilateral withdrawal strategies that dominated Israeli thinking in previous decades.

Shifting Strategic Paradigm

The events of October 7, 2023, represent a significant turning point across the breadth and depth of Israeli society. The connection between settlement and security is now seen as vital, and concessions made in the past in this context are widely viewed as a political mistake.

The implications of these findings are far-reaching for Israeli policy and strategic planning:

1. The broad support for resettlement across demographic groups suggests any future Israeli government will face public pressure to maintain or expand territorial control in previously evacuated areas.

2. The strong correlation between security concerns and settlement support indicates that security arguments, rather than historical or religious claims, may now be the dominant factor driving settlement policy.

3. The dramatic increase in those viewing a Palestinian state as an existential threat suggests diminished public support for territorial concessions in peace negotiations.

4. The preference for continued Israeli security control even among those opposing settlements indicates a narrowed policy debate focused on implementation methods rather than the principle of control.

   
   

The events of October 7, 2023, constitute a significant turning point for the breadth and depth of Israeli society – it is right to examine the data in a continuing trend, but at this point in time, five months after the outbreak of the war, attitudes in Israeli society indicate that the connection between settlement and security is vital, and that concessions made in the past in this context were a political mistake.

This research documents a profound transformation in Israeli strategic thinking following the October 7th attacks. What emerges is a society that has fundamentally reassessed its security needs and the role of territorial control in meeting those needs. The findings suggest that regardless of which political faction holds power, Israeli policy is likely to prioritize direct security control over previously evacuated territories for the foreseeable future.