A Strategic Brief

Executive Remarks

• The deal represents an implementation framework rather than a final status solution. Success will be measured by demilitarization metrics, border control, and a governance handoff that excludes Hamas.

• U.S. involvement is limited to coordination outside Gaza. Israel welcomes this support as long as it reinforces deconfliction and protects Israeli operational security.

• Humanitarian facilitation must be real yet conditional. Aid levels should rise as compliance rises and must be protected from diversion by the right distribution mechanism.

• Hamas cannot be the partner in Gaza’s next chapter. Its own believes and current behavior argue against that assumption.

The war’s trajectory in Gaza, October 2023 to October 2025

The conflict entered its third year this month. It began with Hamas’s coordinated assault on October 7, 2023 when this murderous terror organization, butchered mercilessly roughly 1,200 people inside Israel – including American, French, and British citizens – and abducted 251 hostages from a dozen nationalities including holocaust survivors’ elderly, children and infants into Gaza. Israel’s response was an extensive air and ground campaign intended to dismantle Hamas’s armed forced and governance infrastructure and recover hostages. As of October 2025, Israeli authorities report 916 IDF soldiers killed and over 12,000 wounded in the different fronts’ operations since October 27, 2023. Hamas’s Gaza health authorities claimed allegedly67,000 casualties by October 7, 2025, despite not standing with burden of proof and serious documentation issues; the figures are widely cited by UN bodies, while their authenticity remains under severe scrutiny, in particular the civiliancombatant ratio.

Hostages remained the galvanizing issue for Israeli society and a principal driver of military tempo and diplomacy. Over two years, combinations of rescue operations and negotiated exchanges brought home scores of captives; others recovered deceased. As of midOctober 2025, Israel and Hamas concluded an initial ceasefire stage that included the release of the last 20 living Israeli hostages and 28 bodies of killed hostages, parallel prisoner releases. Implementation has been fraught. As of October 19, 2025, Hamas released all 20 live hostages, returned only 12 bodies and claimed unable to locate and retrieve the remaining ones. Israel fulfilled its side in the agreement and has already released all 1,968 incarcerated terrorist felonies.

In addition, Israel has retreated to the so-called “Yellow Line”, marking its control over 53% of the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi and Morag corridors, and has begun demarcating the physical line on the ground.

Tactically, the IDF’s campaign proceeded in phases: urban ground operations north to south through Gaza’s cities; strikes on tunnel complexes; and repeated raids to degrade reconstituting Hamas cells. Israel asserts it has killed large numbers of Hamas fighters and command figures; Hamas counters that the movement remains capable of governance and security enforcement. The qualitative outcome is mixed. Hamas’s territorial control and public administration were badly degraded, yet the organization has shown an ability to reassert coercive presence where Israeli forces pulled back. Moreover, as of mid-October, in the days after IDF withdrawal to the yellow line, Hamas is openly massacring their own people, Gazans who are blamed to be cooperatives of the IDF or clan leaders which Hamas sees them as threat to their dominion of the Stripe. The humanitarian collapse, high civilian toll, and protracted siege have reshaped international opinion and reordered regional diplomacy, setting the stage for the current dealmaking.

Phase A of the current deal: what it is, and what it is not 

The October 9, 2025 Sharm elSheikh agreement formalized an initial stage of a broader multiphase framework. The onepage text, signed on Israel’s behalf by Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, lays out the operative steps. First, Israel approves an immediate end to active hostilities and withdraws to mapped lines inside Gaza within 24 hours. Second, within 72 hours of that withdrawal, Hamas must release all living Israeli hostages and return the remains of deceased hostages in its custody or held by other factions; where remains are not located in time, Hamas must provide all available information through a mediatorrun mechanism and continue efforts until completion. Third, Israel conducts parallel prisoner releases from agreed lists and allows a surge of humanitarian aid consistent with prior arrangements. Fourth, a “task force” of the United States, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey and others monitors implementation and coordinates with both sides. Exchanges are to occur quietly without public ceremonies.

The parties began implementing Phase A between October 10 and 15. Hamas transferred the last 20 living hostages and several bodies. Israel, which had conditioned parts of the aid surge on timely returns, signaled it would reopen Rafah and allow hundreds of trucks, subject to security checks. Disputes over the pace and identification of remains, however, remain an early stress test.

Two auxiliary elements matter for Israeli planners. First, Washington announced a 200person U.S. contribution to the multinational task force. U.S. officials emphasize no American boots inside Gaza and a focus on commandandcontrol, deconfliction, and support to partners. Second, Ankara stated it intends to join the task force and “monitor implementation,” underscoring Turkey’s elevated diplomatic role in the runup to the agreement. Neither announcement alone resolves core endstate questions about disarmament benchmarks, governance transfer, and border regimes, but both shape the operating environment for the next phase.

Finally, Phase A does not itself disarm Hamas or set the permanent political horizon; it is a timebounded package to halt fighting, return people, and create space for negotiations. Between Phase A and later stages, there are hinge risks: movement from humanitarian access to demilitarization metrics, and from deconfliction to a credible transition in Gaza’s governance into a technocratic transitional government. 

What now? Key questions from an Israeli vantage point

Hamas is rebuilding itself, not Gaza

Videos and reports from this week (mid-October) indicate Hamas has executed rivals and asserted coercive authority in parts of Gaza. Germany publicly labelled such executions “acts of terror against the population.” Some news agencies reported that Hamas drafted 7,000 new terrorists since the IDF withdraw to the yellow line and independent media noted clashes with local clans and the use of internal enforcement units. This confirms a structural reality: unless Hamas is forced to relinquish its armed forced and financial lifelines, it will brutally and violently prevent competitive politics, spoil any transition plans and continuously be the obstacle to any non-violent solution in Gaza, For Israel, the implication is to calibrate Phase B conditions around verifiable demilitarization of Hamas and how to respond smartly to this situation.

Turkish participation and the “neoOttoman” problem set

Turkey’s stated intent to participate in a Gaza task force intersects with longstanding Israeli concerns about Ankara’s support networks, intelligence alignment, and regional ambitions. President Erdogan’s government openly frames Gaza as a central moral and strategic issue, positions itself as a guarantor, and is ready to commit forces to monitoring roles. Israeli decisionmakers will weigh two levers. On the plus side, Turkey has channels into Hamas leadership and influence in Doha and to some extent in Cairo, which could be used to extract compliance on hostage remains and enforce nonrearmament baselines. On the risk side, Ankara’s political affinity for Hamas, tensions with Egypt, and friction with Israel in the Mediterranean theater create potential mandate drift and spike tension. President Erdogan has a history of using inflammatory and aggressive language towards Israel, threaten to invade Israel, promised to reach to Gaza, repeatedly defended Hamas as a "liberation group" rather than a terrorist organization. Moreover, Turkey continues to host senior Hamas leaders and is believed to have provided financial and logistical support to the group. On the top of all that, Erdogan bluntly works against Israel in the global arena. Turkish troops deployment inside Gaza will have the mission to prioritize deconfliction and supposed to be helpful but do not answer the strategic question of whether Turkey will constrain or shield Hamas over time.

Egypt’s calculus

Cairo has played a vital role in brokering steps and hosting the summit. Egypt wants to avoid mass displacement into Sinai, prevent jihadist spillover, maintain primacy over Rafah, and convert diplomatic capital into Western and Gulf support. It seeks burdensharing, not sole responsibility, for border security and postwar governance. While various reports claim that the PA signaled readiness to operate Rafah with EU support if politics allow, Israel continues to assert its full control over the Philadelphi corridor, with talks on some level of Egyptian and European involvement in the Rafah Crossing, combined with robust countersmuggling technologies and barriers on both sides of the Philadelphi Corridor. The price is sustained IsraeliEgyptian intelligence cooperation and acceptance that Cairo will resist steps that empower Gaza actors affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Can the deal expand the Abraham Accords?

If Phase A holds and later stages deliver visible demilitarization and a governance transition, the incentive structure for Arab normalizers improves. The UAE quickly welcomed the firstphase agreement, and U.S. officials hint that Emirati participation in the task force or reconstruction is likely. However, deep public skepticism persists, particularly in Saudi Arabia. In practice, the opportunity is real, “Peace through strength” is working it ways, especially in the Middle East when a country demonstrates military strength, economic development and moral fiber rooted in it values, other countries respect it and approach to make agreements – as far as even Indonesia.

Strategic realism: why the conflict will not be “solved” by this deal

Israeli strategy must assume that ideology and intent are not transformed by a ceasefire. Hamas’s founding charter calls for Israel’s elimination and frames the conflict in civilizational terms. Recent attacks and hostagetaking reinforced that Hamas’s operational doctrine tolerates mass civilian harm. From an Israeli perspective, longterm arrangements must therefore build layered deterrence and denial, not rely on goodwill. That means sustained interdiction of Iranian and other external financing and weapons pipelines and performancebased steps for governance in Gaza that tie reconstruction to security benchmarks. Anything less risks allowing a battered but intact Hamas to regenerate. Which bring us directly to the next part – what actually can be done?

Practical next steps for Phase B and beyond

1. Demilitarization metrics. Complete demilitarization, tunnel destruction. Independent monitors should include vetted nonTurkish NATO personnel and EU specialists acceptable on Israel.

2. Humanitarian surge with accountability. Israel should facilitate the agreed aid flow while enforcing diversion safeguards. The truck convoys must be vetted again by non-UN agency like the GHF mechanism. UN agencies have been proving over and over again to assist terror entities and, in some cases, personnels were terror activists.

3. Transitional governance. Hamas cannot and will not continue to rule. A new government should be rise – as long as it does endanger Israels security and interests.

The Narrative and deterrence: Israeli leaders will continue to state that disarmament is nonnegotiable. This must be paired with a clear articulation to allies: no Hamas combat formations, no independent arsenal, and a governance partner that can deliver services without military wings. 

Conclusion

From an Israeli viewpoint, Phase A is a necessary ceasefire mechanics package, not a solution. The next stage should be judged by whether it measurably disarms Hamas and creates a path to a nonHamas governance structure that can deliver services and collect taxes without a militia in the shadows. Success on those terms will also create political space to revive and broaden normalization with key Arab states. Failure to secure those outcomes will likely produce a frozen conflict, periodic flareups, and rising pressure on Israel from international players without increased security.