In early June 2025, speculation emerged in international media suggesting that France might move unilaterally to recognize a Palestinian state. This potential diplomatic shift was expected to be formally addressed at a United Nations conference scheduled to take place in New York from June 17 to 20. However, the onset of the Israel-Iran conflict on June 13 led to the subsequent rescheduling of the event to July 28–29. The upcoming UN General Assembly in September will discuss this further.

By mid-July, various media reports suggested that the gathering would be reformatted as a summit rather than a formal conference. Additionally, it was confirmed that neither French President Emmanuel Macron nor Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would be in attendance, thereby reducing the likelihood of any major announcements being made. Macron’s push for the recognition of a Palestinian state faced resistance from the United States, fully aware of the risks presented by hasty decisions.

In the end, the summit was spearheaded by the French ambassador to the UN, Jerome Bonnafont, who told the Associated Press that an independent Palestinian state would be recognized by over 145 nations. The summit produced a seven-page declaration urging further recognitions, indicated as “essential and indispensable” to reach a two-state solution. France and Saudi Arabia asked all 193 U.N. members to endorse the proposal by early September, before the world leaders’ gathering.

The French initiative is primarily aimed at increasing international pressure on Israel as, without a bilateral agreement with Israel and the support of the United States, recognition remains symbolic. Furthermore, as Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani also stated, it is not possible to recognize something that does not exist: "We are in favor of recognizing the Palestinian state," but "recognizing something that does not exist is unrealistic."

While the French initiative has not led to anything concrete in terms of practical recognition, it has nevertheless provided lifeblood to Hamas, which immediately praised the initiative and took the credit for it, indicating it as “the fruits of October 7”.

President Macron's push to recognize a nonexistent Palestinian state at all costs seems to have little to do with genuine support for the cause, but rather a result of the French president's severe domestic political difficulties, with support at an all-time low since the founding of the Fifth Republic.

It seems that Macron is seeking the support of France's growing Muslim population for political expedience, all at the expense of domestic security. It is no coincidence that Macron was outraged by the publication of a report by the Ministry of the Interior that exposed a dramatic situation regarding Islamist infiltration in the country. Macron also appears not to recognize the link between Islamist extremism, terrorism, and the Palestinian cause, a phenomenon that seriously threatens French internal security.

The crisis of “Macronism” and the pursuit of Muslim support

From a European Union perspective, a unilateral recognition of Palestine by France would risk undermining both the unity of the EU and the credibility of its common foreign and security policy. In fact, a centerpiece to the EU’s mechanism is unanimous, rather than fragmented foreign policy action. EU member states currently hold divergent views on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. To date, only three member states have officially recognized “Palestine” as a state: Ireland and Spain on May 28, 2024, and Slovenia on June 4, 2024.

US president, Donald Trump, expressed his displeasure and his disagreement with France, as well as with the United Kingdom and Canada, which announced their willingness to recognize a Palestinian state, as that is rewarding Hamas, the true impediment to a ceasefire and to the release of all of the hostages.

Macron's push to recognize a Palestinian state, unilaterally, hastily, and without consulting the European Union, seems to be driven by personal domestic political interests, which are shortsighted and extremely risky in terms of internal and international security, as well as in the fight against terrorism.

The increasing costs of life, unemployment on the rise, rampant crime and illegal immigration are all issues that led to a collapse in consensus for Macron. More than eight out of ten people say that the centrist political ideology of “Macronism” will die out with his final term. As reported by The Telegraph, according to 82% of French voters, Macron’s centrist Renaissance movement has been a “failure”. Moreover, among the president’s Renaissance supporters, 59% agreed that the president’s centrist movement could disappear by 2027.   

Furthermore, according to the July IFOP/JDD barometer, Emmanuel Macron and François Bayrou form the least popular presidential duo since the birth of the Fifth Republic. The president has only 19% approval, while the prime minister hits a record low of just 18%.

Macron is now seeking support among Arab-Islamic communities, which appears to be a key reason behind his increased engagement with the Palestinian cause. This strategy seems aimed at building consensus within these groups. It is worth recalling that in May, Macron became furious with his ministers following the leak of a report detailing the infiltration of radical Islamist movements in France, particularly those associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and what is often referred to as "political Islam." As reported by Politico, the official document was expected to be published on Wednesday, May 21, but its release was delayed by Macron’s office after an early version of the document was leaked to the media.

The leaked Interior Ministry report

The cited report highlights the presence in France of two distinct yet interconnected Islamist dynamics: on one hand, the long-standing and structured influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, currently represented by organizations such as Les Musulmans de France (Muslims of France), and on the other, a wider network of Islamist actors who, while not formally affiliated with the Brotherhood, align with its ideological principles and methods.

The expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood beyond the Arab-Muslim world is based on two pillars: the recruitment of those fleeing crackdowns against the Movement in their countries of origin and a strategy of "grassroots Islamization." The latter is implemented through educational programs, charitable work, and a well-funded and relentless proselytism capable of infiltrating every neighborhood and suburb. In Europe, and particularly in France, they have built an influential yet discreet network of umbrella associations, religious centers, private schools, and mosques.

According to analysts from the Ministry, the Muslim Brotherhood employs a dual communication strategy, a double-language typical of the Movement. When addressing French-speaking audiences, it emphasizes themes such as the promotion of interreligious dialogue, thereby seeking legitimacy within the framework of the Republic. Conversely, its Arabic-language messaging adopts a markedly different tone, characterized by strong assertions of Muslim identity, communalism, and open hostility toward Western values. This includes overt opposition to secularism, denigration of women's rights, and a polarizing narrative around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The document also details how certain Islamist rhetoric, particularly related to Israel, devolves into overt anti-Semitism. It notes explicit support for jihadist movements, including Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, organizations such as the now-dissolved CCIF (Collective Against Islamophobia in France) have been accused of instrumentalizing accusations of "Islamophobia" to undermine and delegitimize Republican institutions and policies.

The very concept of "Islamophobia," at the center of a semantic and political battle, is criticized in the report for its profound ambiguity: often, behind the denunciation of discrimination lies a strategy to impose religious norms in public spaces and accuse of racism those who defend secularism. The accusation of “Islamophobia” is also often used in an attempt to intimidate and silence the media when Islamist activity is exposed.

An additional aspect of interest concerns the Islamist political infiltration on a local level. As explained in the report, while the Islamists’ engagement in national politics remains relatively limited, its members are deeply involved at the local level, working to advance their agenda and strengthen their networks. Although they have not yet formed independent community-based electoral lists, they are exerting growing, at times aggressive, pressure on local officials, facilitated by a strategy of gradual rapprochement initiated in the 1990s. In this context, the Islamist agenda appears to have found a particularly effective channel through municipal structures, where a favorable electoral balance of power has emerged.

The substantial rise in municipal influence achieved by Islamist groups in recent years indicates, if it has not already occurred, a transition from a model of community-based electoral management, wherein certain local officials secured their voter base through the distribution of benefits, to more formalized alliances. These evolving partnerships may involve the integration of Islamists into prominent positions on electoral lists or within the offices of elected representatives.

The general plan is to infiltrate the political arena on a national level, starting from the bottom, on local scale, and moving upwards. It is the typical strategy adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as well since its formation in the early 20^th century.

The domestic security situation

France is suffering a strong infiltration by the Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, with the objectives of influencing French foreign policy, especially concerning France’s relations with Israel and domestically by promoting what French authorities have defined as “Islamist separatism”, which means enforcing Sharia-based laws and contrasting secularism and French republican values and principles.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not merely a religious movement; it operates as a structured, transnational network with a clear political agenda focused on fostering an Islamized society from within, and at odds with secular democratic principles. As documented in the book “Qatar Papers” by French investigative journalists Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot, many mosques and religious institutions affiliated with the Brotherhood receive substantial funding from Qatar. This financial support is often accompanied by ideological influences that reflect theocratic perspectives considered incompatible with democratic governance.

In addition to Islamist infiltration, France has also been experiencing a surge in jihadist terrorist attacks such the Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan, and Stade de France attacks (2015), the Nice truck ramming attack on Bastille Day (2016), the Strasbourg Christmas market attack (2018), and the beheading of French professor Samuel Paty (2020), just to cite some.

The January 2025 report published by the French Gendarmerie Research Center indicated a continuing jihadist activity and a rising number of arrests for the year 2024. Three attacks have been reported, in Laon, La Ferte-Bernard, and La Gran Motte. The report highlighted that jihadist activity is on the rise in the Western world, particularly as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a return of attacks and plots against the Jewish community in France, which had not occurred since 2016. A growing number of individuals in France have become radicalized, making jihadism a significant national security concern. A substantial proportion of the foreign fighters who traveled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS between 2014 and 2018 originated from France. The ideology underpinning jihadism has gained considerable traction, particularly in certain suburban low-income areas known as “banlieues”.

According to official French institutional data from 2024, approximately 20,000 individuals are listed under the "Fiche S" classification, indicating a potential threat to national security due to suspected ties to terrorist organizations or other subversive activities, including around 1,000 minors.

In August 2021, France introduced the “anti-separatism law,” aimed at strengthening the government's capacity to uphold secular principles and address religious separatism. The legislation grants authorities broader powers to swiftly close places of worship and religious schools, prohibit extremist preachers, combat online hate speech, and monitor foreign funding of religious organizations.

Nevertheless, the situation remains critical, as highlighted in a July 2024 report by French journalist Étienne Delarcher. Over a span of three years, Delarcher visited 70 mosques, primarily those regarded as moderate, rather than those known for radical affiliations. His findings were striking: even within these so-called moderate circles, there was a prevailing aspiration for a France governed by Sharia law."

Delarcher collected dozens of hours of recordings featuring statements by religious leaders encouraging individuals to commit unlawful acts, ostensibly in defense of the prophet Mohammad’s teachings. One such example concerns the issue of marital disobedience. When a wife repeatedly disobeys, and verbal guidance fails to correct her behavior, one imam is heard advising: "Then you have to hit her [...] but not in the face, because you risk breaking her nose or putting out an eye, and you'd have to pay”.

The investigative journalist also detected an obvious double language (typical of the Muslim Brotherhood as well). Public discourse is much more controlled, because there's always the threat of deportation," while in private he witnessed a narrative against homosexuals, against secularism and in favor of the establishment of a theocratic state.

The Palestinian issue and the link to terrorism in France

Until the October 7, 2023 massacre in southern Israel, Hamas was seen as primarily an Israeli issue; however, the terrorist offensive soon revealed that Hamas was actually a much broader problem that affected the entire West. It was no longer just a local terrorist organization, but an ideology of hatred shared by global jihadism and far-left groups. The enemy was no longer just Israel, but all those countries that support the Jewish state.

The so-called "Palestinian cause" is being used and exploited by Islamists and jihadists to gain traction within public opinion and the political arena in France and Europe. As Hamas once said: “The Palestinian cause is not about land and soil, but it is about faith and belief”.

Hamas now represents an extremely dangerous ideology that is widespread all over the world. It has been embraced by Islamists and jihadists in the West who are willing to act against their common enemies: France, Europe, the United States, and the UK, all accused of supporting Israel.

Although, so far, Hamas has not targeted France in any way, its constant calls to global jihad against Israel and its allies may still have implications within the country. This influence is unlikely to stem from Hamas' direct networks, but rather from supporters or individuals affiliated with other jihadist groups that share similar ideological foundations. Additionally, it may extend to isolated or lone actors. 

As indicated in the previously quoted report published in January 2025 by the French Gendarmerie Research Center, the format of the 2024 terrorist attacks is in fact similar to the one of previous years: they are carried out by isolated individuals already present on French territory. While arrests of minors are more frequent, probably due to their propensity for online communication, all attacks are carried out by adults, choosing relatively habitual targets. Bladed weapons remain the preferred modus operandi for jihadists in 2024, but the presence of unused firearms in two attacks, at La Ferté-Bernard and La Grande-Motte, indicates a possible return of jihadist shootings on French soil. 

Moreover, it is important to highlight that the violence perpetrated by banlieues-based Islamists is on the rise.

As exposed by Swiss investigative journalist Stefano Piazza in an article published in early August 2025 by the Italian daily newspaper La Verità, between June and July 2025 France was rocked by a new wave of urban violence that affected several suburbs across the country: from Paris to cities such as Lyon, Limoges, Nanterre, Clichy-sous-Bois, Colombes, Aubervilliers, and Mantes-la-Jolie. The clashes took the form of full-blown urban battles, with town halls, schools, police stations, and libraries set on fire.

French security forces described a systematic use of paramilitary tactics, with masked thugs operating in a coordinated manner to evade police lines, strike their targets, and quickly retreat using their knowledge of the area. The attackers moved in small groups, in constant contact with each other via radio or encryption applications.

The Limoges prefecture spoke of "an unprecedented level of violence," also raising suspicions that the rioters may have been trained by individuals with experience in urban combat, perhaps former foreign fighters in Syria.

In conclusion

France currently finds itself in a rather problematic situation regarding the spread of Islamist ideology and jihadist penetration in the country. Despite significant experience in fighting jihadism, which has massively affected the country since 2015, and the specific laws enacted to combat so-called religious "separatism," the risks remain so high that the Ministry of the Interior recently released a report detailing all the issues.

Grassroots political infiltration by Islamists, the spread of jihadist ideology in the suburbs, uncontrolled immigration from Muslim countries, and the pro-Hamas megaphone that further inflames Islamists are all factors that put the country's situation at risk, and consequently that of Europe as well.

Now more than ever, French policymakers should work towards an international common front against Islamism and jihadism. Engaging with or seeking political support from within the ranks of Islamism would not only be a short-sighted and counterproductive move to foreign policy, but it could also be perceived by the jihadists as a sign of weakness and an attempt to placate Islamist public pressure, therefore encouraging further violent actions inside France.

A more effective way to deal with the growing and unprecedented Islamist threat in France than carrying out harsh unilateral actions against its ally Israel would therefore be fighting Islamism directly, before it is too late.