Social perceptions and the level of motivation to enlist in the IDF

1.Introduction

Since the October 7, 2023 attack and the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” War, research and surveys have shown a sharp rise in motivation to serve in the IDF—particularly in willingness to serve in combat roles—following a decade marked by an accelerated shift toward non-combat and prestige-oriented service paths driven by individualistic motivations among Israeli youth. This phenomenon is supported by in-depth civil–military studies indicating that national traumatic events rapidly reshape the value priorities of conscription-age cohorts, restoring the salience of ideological–normative motives. However, the stability of this pattern depends on sustained trust, perceived fairness, competence, and institutional support. Professional reports in military psychology further emphasize that initial motivation for military service is also influenced by social–public framing and the visibility of combat soldiers’ contributions; without reinforcement mechanisms (trust in command, proper conditions, recognition), such motivation may erode over time.

Over the past generation, research has documented a gradual shift in the motivational composition of Israeli youth regarding military enlistment—from a collectivist–ideological orientation toward a more individualistic one (self-fulfillment, personal benefit)—coupled with a relatively stable willingness to enlist but changing inclinations toward combat service by gender, family background, and residential area. Previous case studies demonstrated that public polarization and ambiguity regarding operational achievements undermine willingness to undertake demanding service, rendering technological roles more attractive. This baseline allows for assessing the magnitude of the post–October 7 “reversal.”

Research conducted by the movement HaBitachonistim ('The Securityists') has identified these trends while emphasizing two analytical layers: mapping of ethos and perceptions before and during the war, and demonstration of operational variables linked to morale and sustained willingness. 

The compendium Am Lochem (HaBitachonistim, 2025) presents findings underscoring the importance of emphasizing achievements as long-term motivational drivers, including within the reserve force, alongside such factors as religiosity and region of residence. The Ethos Study situates the younger generation’s choices within the concept of the “Citizen-Soldier" Army,” demonstrating how background variables (gender, religiosity, parents’ military service) interact, and explaining how traumatic events elevate the threshold of willingness to volunteer for combat duties.

Nevertheless, it is argued that the ongoing debate over the distribution of the security burden within Israeli society, particularly regarding the conscription of Haredim (ultra-Orthodox Jews), serves as a central axis explaining fluctuations in motivation. When structural unfairness is perceived, the sense of mutuality erodes, and willingness for meaningful service diminishes. The literature indicates that perceived fairness functions as a mediating variable: it links the moral–emotional impulse with the sustained behavioral commitment to combat and reserve service. Reducing polarization, fostering unifying public framing, and presenting measurable achievements are effective tools for reinforcing trust, especially over the course of a prolonged conflict.

Research question:

What are the effects of the ongoing war on social perceptions and on the level of Israeli youths’ motivation to enlist in the IDF in general, and to volunteer for combat service in particular?

Sub-questions:

1. Has the perceived socio-security ethos among Israeli youth changed over the past two years?

2. In which publics is an increase in motivation evident, and in which publics do the trends differ?

3. What are the family-level influences on motivation for combat service?

4. What is the effect of the temporal dimension (war duration) on motivation to serve in the IDF?

5. Does the social conflict surround the Haredi sector conscription affect enlistment motivation?

The study will address these questions by analyzing longitudinal trends since 2016 regarding social perceptions and the level of youths’ motivation to enlist in the IDF.

2.Scientific Background

A. Trends in Motivation for IDF Service

IDF surveys over the past three years indicate a transition from a decline in motivation to serve in 2022 to a sharp increase in 2024–2025. The data show a high proportion of willingness to serve in combat positions, reflecting an intensification of the security dimension relative to the social dimension during a prolonged state of emergency (Meida La’am, 2023; Meida La’am, 2025). Previous policy documents described erosion in the perceived necessity of service and instability in motivation, whereas during the “Iron Swords” War, motivation was maintained and even increased, accompanied by renewed discourse on the legitimacy of combat (Israeli Democracy Institute, 2023; IDF, 2025).

Nonetheless, recent public opinion surveys demonstrate that motivation is sensitive to normative frameworks such as conscription laws and the principle of equality in sharing the national burden. A perception of unfairness is likely to weaken willingness to serve in combat roles, even amid heightened security threats (INSS, 2025). The increase is particularly prominent among men with combat eligibility, reflecting a high willingness to join combat units, while a moderate rise is also observed among eligible women (Shoval, 2025; Meida La’am, 2025).

Corresponding data on the social ethos suggest that value-based differences by gender, religiosity, region, and socio-economic status persist. Alongside a growing preference for intelligence and cyber units, there remains stability and even a slight increase in combat-related professions, indicating that motivation is distributed differently across tracks and demographic segments (IDSF, 2023).

Publicly available data during the “Iron Swords” War illustrate a reversal in long-term trends and a general rise in enlistment motivation. However, other surveys highlight intensified societal polarization and value-based political conflict surrounding the difficulties in conscripting the ultra-Orthodox population, disputes over governmental reforms, and criticism regarding the prolonged nature of the war, including the handling of the hostages' situation with Hamas. These social dynamics cast doubt on the durability of the observed wave of youth motivation and on the underlying influence of societal conflict on this trend.

B. Family Influences

Studies on social ethos indicate an intergenerational transmission of values: parents’ military service, level of religiosity, region, and socio‑economic status affect their children’s willingness to serve in the IDF in general and in combat units in particular including distinct contributions of fathers and mothers to the security‑oriented versus civil‑liberal dimensions of motivation (IDSF, 2023). These findings align with theories of cultural tradition and socio‑moral capital, which highlight the family unit as a mediating factor in the perception of threat, commitment, and volunteerism, thereby shaping motivational responses to changes in the security environment.

Regarding reserve service in Israel, the willingness to continue serving is influenced primarily by economic incentives, support conditions, and combat equipment levels—rather than by declarative value‑based statements alone. This distinction separates initial enlistment decisions from the maintenance of motivation throughout prolonged service (IDSF, 2025). However, public opinion surveys reveal growing difficulties in motivation to continue reserve enlistment during the current war effort (Ynet, 2025). These findings may also point to internal family impacts, as the burden of reserve duty affects the readiness for combat service among family members. This issue gains further significance in light of claims that the workload on soldiers’ families has become unbearable, and that it is no longer feasible to sustain the war due to emotional, economic, and family distress (Harush, 2025). The unprecedented cumulative strain over time may constitute an “Achilles’ heel” for recruitment motivation, as the weakening of the family unit reduces the willingness of the next generation to serve—a relationship previously identified in earlier studies (Itsik, 2021).

C. The Prolonged Nature of the War

A recent military report describes high levels of public commitment to enlistment alongside emerging signs of motivational fatigue, reflecting a nonlinear trend as the war continues (IDF, 2025). Studies on reserve service indicate that over time, the relative importance of operational and institutional factors such as equipment, service conditions, and incentives grows in comparison to the initial enthusiasm of national solidarity that characterized the mass mobilization at the war’s outset (IDSF, 2025).

Policy surveys further demonstrate that the structuring of legal frameworks and the discourse surrounding equality in bearing the national security burden negatively affect long‑term motivation, particularly as the war endures and normative‑political dimensions gain increasing prominence (Fuchs, 2025). This claim is supported by a series of public opinion polls and policy papers showing that the design of legal frameworks concerning conscription and burden‑sharing translates directly into perceptions of fairness and legitimacy, which in turn sustain motivation for military service, especially during protracted conflict (INSS, 2025).

Findings from the July survey indicate that a significant majority of the Jewish public believes that a law exempting most ultra‑Orthodox men from service would harm motivation for combat enlistment. The increase in this attitude compared with September 2024 reflects heightened sensitivity to mechanisms of fair security burden distribution during extended wartime. Moreover, additional policy documents from the Institute for National Security Studies caution that sharp differentiation in conscription laws may, over time, erode willingness for “meaningful service”—that is, qualitative aspects of motivation rather than mere quantitative enlistment rates.

In parallel, the normative–political discourse surrounding “equality in burden-sharing” underscores the growing influence of value-based and institutional dimensions on individual decision-making. This influence intensifies as the war continues and both public and military fatigue deepen (JPPI, 2025). The Israeli Society Index (March 2025) found that a majority of the public perceives recent legislative efforts regarding conscription and exemptions as politically motivated measures aimed at coalition survival. This perception undermines public trust and weakens civic-driven compliance—an illustration of how the attribution of political motives to recruitment policies erodes the perceived legitimacy of the legal framework.

Mechanisms of Erosion and Risk Factors

The prolonged war, combined with the psychological and familial burden of sustained mobilization and the politicization of security discourse, constitutes clear fatigue-inducing factors. Research in military sociology and military psychology emphasizes that without adequate household support, fair service conditions, and transparent, credible communication, initial motivation tends to wane, pushing service preferences back toward lower-risk tracks. A central variable is the establishment of meaningful positioning within operational frameworks: commanding officers, unit cohesion, and localized social solidarity shape ongoing commitment more effectively than short-term motivational campaigns.

Summary of the Literature Review

Data published over the past three years regarding motivation for service in the IDF and for combat units in particular, demonstrate a sharp reversal of trend: from a decline up to 2022 to a steep increase in 2024–2025. This shift includes partial narrowing of gender gaps and reduced variance across social sectors and military professions. The family unit serves as a moral driver, while institutional frameworks either stabilize or erode motivation over time (Meida La’am, 2023; Meida La’am, 2025; INSS, 2025; IDF, 2025).

Nonetheless, these findings may be subject to gradual erosion, primarily due to the ongoing duration of the war, the increasing stress on the home front, the heavy burden placed on service members’ families, the cumulative cost in casualties, and the societal conflict surrounding draft exemptions for certain groups within Israeli society. These converging factors sharpen the study’s guiding research question: What are the effects of the ongoing war on social perceptions and on the level of motivation among Israeli youth to enlist in the IDF in general, and to serve in combat roles in particular?

3.Findings

A. Methodology

The present study employs a quantitative research design, utilizing a survey distributed via social media platforms during August–October 2025 and targeting the 16–18 age cohort. The sample includes 445 adolescents (allowing for a maximum sampling error of 4.5%), based on an estimated population size of N=250,000. Participants were given the option to provide contact information for potential qualitative follow-up interviews- 43% chose to do so.

This study constitutes the fifth wave in a longitudinal series examining Israeli youth over the past decade and the third wave since the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” War. It represents a significant milestone in understanding the trends affecting youth since the war’s onset and in assessing its impact using standardized measures developed for the longitudinal questionnaire. Based on these scales, comparative analyses were conducted across demographic, socio-economic, social, and familial variables over five distinct periods: 2016–2017, 2018–2021, 2022–2023, 2024, and 2025.

Data collection relied on self-reported responses to an online questionnaire examining several clusters: national–liberal ethos, motivation for IDF service, perception of security threats, family influences, and socio-economic as well as geographic factors.

Research Limitation:

The sample shows underrepresentation of the ultra-Orthodox population, which is generally less active on social media, and of the Arab population, most of whom do not serve mandatory military service in the IDF. However, the proportion of respondents identifying as “religiously observant or ultra-Orthodox” is higher than in previous longitudinal studies conducted in this field over the past decade.

B. Participant Profile (n = 445)

-Mean age: 17.7-Gender: 37% female, 63% male-Region of residence: Central 37%, Near periphery 29%, Distant periphery 30%, -Border/Conflict zones 4%-Ethnicity/Nationality: Jewish 92%, Druze 2%, Other 6%-Level of religiosity: Anti-religious 4%, Secular 36%, Traditional 17%, Religious 38%,  Ultra-Orthodox 5%

C. Service Type Preference

Graph 1 illustrates the trend in motivation for military service among pre‑enlistment youth between 2016 and 2025. At the beginning of the period, a clear preference was observed for support roles rather than direct combat positions. Over the years, however, a discernible shift emerged toward prioritizing combat roles themselves—an expression of youths’ growing desire to take an active part in the defense of the nation. Rear‑echelon positions, which in the past attracted high demand, have gradually declined in relative preference, though they continue to represent a valued component of the overall service profile.

The graph indicates that 2023 marks a distinct turning point: the demand for combat roles surged, reflecting an intensified understanding that the primary contribution to national security lies at the operational front. This trend further strengthened in 2024 and 2025, with combat positions becoming the clear top priority, while combat‑support functions maintained their status as an important and respected layer within the military force structure.

The “Other” category has shifted to the margins, with proportions ranging from low single‑digit to low double‑digit percentages. This pattern underscores that the vast majority of Israeli youth now choose to situate their service within the three principal pathways—combat, combat‑support, and rear‑area roles—demonstrating a deep commitment to serving in capacities vital to the security of the State of Israel.

D. Positions vs. Statements

An analysis of social attitudes among Israeli youth reveals a prevailing understanding that a severe security reality necessitates a resolute stance. Across the attitudinal scale spanning 2016–2025, a marked hardening is evident during the war years of 2023–2025, coinciding with heightened perceptions of threat and increased support for assertive policies and broad powers for state institutions.

Over the period studied, a dual trend emerges: on the one hand, there is a steadily growing willingness to adopt harsher measures against enemies during wartime; on the other hand, a cautious sensitivity toward issues of civil tolerance is maintained, although certain tolerance measures weaken in the face of heightened security concerns. This strengthened perception of threat is also reflected in youth assessments of the likelihood of war—rated in 2016 and 2019 as medium‑high, but becoming more unequivocal in the wartime years.

On the issue of women’s service in combat roles, support remains relatively high (above 4 on a 5‑point scale), yet shows a modest decline. This may indicate a recognition of perceived physiological and psychological limits in frontline units, ongoing operational demands, and implications for reserve service—emphasizing the need for combat forces to preserve maximum efficiency against adversaries. Similarly, the decrease in openness to living alongside Arab neighbors reflects not hostility, but a heightened sense of security risk during wartime. In contrast, consistently low support for “expelling members of Knesset” underscores a commitment to democratic principles and reluctance to exploit exceptional political tools in domestic disputes.

Within the domain of civil liberties, the natural tension of a nation at war becomes apparent: early in the 2023 conflict, support existed for legal principles such as providing representation to terrorists, but in 2024–2025, these were increasingly replaced by pragmatic security considerations. Conversely, there has been a consistent rise in the perceived importance of freedom of expression. This trend suggests that Israeli youth regard the disclosure of reliable information and open public discourse as vital for strengthening societal resilience and institutional legitimacy—even in emergencies.

Regarding defense budget allocations, support for cuts has remained weak throughout the period, dropping further in 2025, indicating recognition that security is a foundational pillar of national survival. Above all, the statement “A Palestinian state equals an existential threat” has received very high levels of support throughout the years, with a clear increase during the wartime period—demonstrating that youth interpret the reality as meaning that the establishment of a Palestinian entity constitutes a danger to Israel’s existence.

Consensus level (level of variance between respondents)

The data presented in Graph 3 clearly illustrate the enduring strength of national consciousness and the preservation of social cohesion even during severe periods of emergency. Most parameters indicate stable levels of agreement among participants, with some domains even showing signs of reinforcement. For example, there is a growing consensus regarding the understanding that “a Palestinian state constitutes an existential threat,” alongside strong opposition to any reduction in the defense budget—a position reflecting the internalization of the need for protection and a strong military.

Conversely, there is a decline in consensus concerning the continuation of the war and openness to living alongside Arab neighbors, outcomes likely influenced by ongoing security tensions. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that despite two consecutive years of complex, multi‑front warfare, Israeli youth maintain a stable consensus across most social and democratic dimensions. There remains firm adherence to norms such as legal representation, freedom of expression, the preservation of the Knesset’s institutional authority, and broad agreement on the inclusion of women in combat roles.

E. Ethos Perception

The data presented in Graph 4 indicate the continuation of a consistent pattern: among Israeli youth, the national ethos remains the dominant foundation relative to the liberal ethos. Nonetheless, over the past decade, no noticeable erosion of the liberal ethos has been observed—even during the wartime years and despite heightened social polarization. According to the findings, the influence of these contextual factors on youth attitudes remains marginal. The results once again illustrate that national and liberal values do not operate as a “zero‑sum game,” but rather coexist as complementary components within the broader value framework of Israeli youth.

F. Political Stance:

The analysis presented in Graph 5 depicts voting patterns among Israeli youth, showing that the “Other” category has experienced significant growth, primarily at the expense of support for left‑wing parties. This trend may indicate a desire among young people for new political frameworks with a national orientation. The data suggest that this is not a transient or marginal protest, but rather an ongoing process that could challenge support, particularly on the right.

The rate of identification with the right‑wing bloc among pre‑enlistment youth is both the highest and most stable throughout the entire period, consistently ranging between 40–45 percent. This stability positions the right as the core ideological pillar and the largest political camp within the next generation of conscripts, grounded in a worldview emphasizing national responsibility and security resilience.

G. Position in the context of the service of the ultra-Orthodox society:

The data presented in Graph 6 show a clear increase in willingness to enlist, even against the backdrop of perceived inequality regarding the conscription of the ultra‑Orthodox community. The daily average score on the index “Enlistment Despite Haredi Exemption” rose from approximately 3.5 (out of 5) at the beginning of 2023 to 4.5 in September 2025, with a consistent upward trend throughout the measured period. This indicates that an increasing number of young Israelis express readiness to join the army despite public tensions surrounding Haredi draft exemptions.

It appears that during times of national emergency and heightened security sensitivity, public discourse and collective experience strengthen the perception of military service as a civic and moral responsibility—and, at times, as a marker of social status—even when feelings of “injustice” persist toward those who do not serve. Consequently, the social message of “sharing the burden” gains momentum, shaping practical attitudes toward broader consensus on enlistment, even among those critical of the existing arrangements.

Despite the ongoing societal debate over ultra‑Orthodox conscription, the data reveal a notable rise in willingness to enlist over the past two years, likely driven by a sense of shared emergency and a deepening discourse on responsibility and partnership. 

In practice, while the ideological controversy over equality in service persists, a growing proportion of young people demonstrate readiness to serve in the IDF—particularly in combat roles compared to previous years.

H. Notable correlations between variables:

Nationalism and Liberalism (negative r):

The strength of this relationship reflects a genuine ideological continuum. Nonetheless, there is a clear linkage between nationalism and a commitment to individual rights, meaning the opposition is present but not absolute.

Religiosity, Nationalism, and Liberalism (nationalism–religiosity: positive r; liberalism–religiosity: negative r: This pattern is well‑recognized within Israel’s multi‑tribal society and attests to the robustness of the indices used.

Attitudes Toward Women in Combat Roles (liberalism: positive r; religiosity and nationalism: negative r: The observed differences reflect equality‑oriented values versus traditional role perceptions and considerations of operational security. This approach underscores the pursuit of optimal force readiness and manpower needs rather than stereotype‑driven assessments.

Perceived Threat and Support for Continued Fighting (moderate positive r): When the public perceives a tangible threat, support for aggressive measures increases. This finding indicates that Israeli youth maintain an assertive stance in the face of national security challenges.

Enlistment Motivation (nationalism: positive r; family exposure to service: positive r: Results show that mutual responsibility and community identity strengthen willingness to serve. It is noteworthy that the variables of religiosity level, school grade level (year cohort), socio‑economic status, and residential region are not statistically significant in the present study’s correlations or regression model. Since the initiation of sampling in 2015, the influence of these variables on youth motivation to enlist in the IDF appears to have diminished to non‑significant levels.

H. Regression model – a variable dependent on motivation for combat service: When examining the model, it was found that its level of significance is very high. Details of the effect of variables:

The effect rating (from high to low) of significant variables in the model:

- Gender: Women's motivation for combat roles is significantly lower than men's

- National perception/consciousness: a strong positive effect on motivation for combat service

- Parental service (threshold of significance): The more combative the parental service, the more   motivated their children are accordingly

- The sense of security threat

4.Discussion

A. Diminished Influence of Socioeconomic Variables

A key finding emerging from the present study is the absence of significant explanatory contribution from demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic background variables in relation to motivation for combat service. In other words, these predictors did not exceed thresholds of statistical significance in the model. A cautious interpretation of this finding suggests a decline in heterogeneity across background groups and the consolidation of a broad combat ethos that reduces gaps in preferences for frontline service across regional and socioeconomic strata.

This change aligns with a reframing of the meaning of IDF service, a heightened willingness toward sacrifice, and a strengthening of collective social bonds in the aftermath of the October 7 trauma. However, it should be qualified that non‑significance does not necessarily equate to the absence of any potential effect.

B. Preference for Combat Units

Analysis of service preferences indicates a distinct and consistent rise in demand for combat positions between 2016 and 2025. The transition from support and rear‑echelon functions toward the core operational arena reflects a growing aspiration among youth to be part of the fighting circle rather than solely the supporting system. This shift intensified after 2023, a period of large‑scale conflict that amplified the sense of urgency in viewing combat service as the principal channel of contribution to the state. These findings reinforce the research proposition that acute security realities generate readiness for personal sacrifice on behalf of the collective.

Nonetheless, the continued demand for rear and combat‑support tracks indicates that youth do not perceive their contribution solely through combat roles, but also through participation in supportive and systemic capacities—a perspective reflecting a sophisticated understanding of Israel’s integrated security concept (Sheffer & Barak, 2020).

C. Effects of the Conflict with the Haredi Community

Findings demonstrate a significant increase in willingness to serve in the IDF despite perceived inequality regarding draft exemptions for the Haredi community, as reflected in the rise of the “Enlistment Despite Haredi Exemption” index from approximately 3.5 to 4.5 (on a 1–5 scale) between 2023 and 2025. Causally, this increase appears most plausible under conditions of emergency and security vulnerability, where public framing of military service as a civic and moral duty may elevate compliance even among those experiencing a sense of “injustice.” This may suggest partial normative internalization that attenuates the inequality effect.

Two mechanisms could account for this trend: (1) reinforcement of “shared burden” norms through public discourse and collective experience during national crisis, which enhances willingness to serve despite ideological reservations; or (2) a reframing of military service as a marker of social status and moral response to perceived inequality, transforming cognitive dissonance into readiness for action, thereby narrowing the gap between social critique and individual enlistment choice.

Importantly, the normative controversy over “equality in burden-sharing” has not disappeared but coexists with increased willingness to serve—an indication of partial coherence between ideological attitudes and behavioral intention, wherein critique persists but declared behavior shifts toward broader consensus.

D. Hardening of Security Perception

Survey data spanning the past decade reveal a clear hardening of public attitudes, especially during the war years 2023–2025. The findings underscore an increasingly rigid perception of the need for assertive security policy and expanded institutional authority in times of emergency, alongside the preservation of core democratic principles. This dual tendency reflects Israel’s characteristic symbiosis between liberty and security.

A noticeable decline is observed in support for women’s participation in combat roles. While support remains relatively high, the downward trend suggests internalization of perceived physiological and psychological limitations alongside an emphasis on maximizing operational effectiveness in combat units. This corresponds with prior research documenting ambivalent public attitudes toward the integration of women in combat service.

Similarly, a substantial reduction in openness to living alongside Arab neighbors likely reflects an intensified perception of national threat. Yet other opinions—such as opposition to weakening the authority of the Knesset or to expelling members of parliament—indicate sustained commitment to institutional democratic norms. Particularly noteworthy is the increase in the importance attributed to freedom of expression, peaking in 2025, suggesting an awareness among youth of systemic complexity and the importance of legitimacy even under conditions of war (Hazan & Rahat, 2010).

In parallel, the persistent support for maintaining a high defense budget and the strong consensus around the statement “A Palestinian state is an existential threat” reflect internalization of the collective “siege mentality” (Itsik, 2000), characterizing a society that perceives itself as threatened and prioritizes security considerations over civil rights or political compromise.

E. Preservation of Consensus

Examination of levels of agreement shows that despite wartime conditions and acute security tension, consensus around core national issues remains stable. Participants consistently prioritize national security over political compromise or civilian budget allocations. This phenomenon likely rests on the cultural dimension of collective cohesion among youth during emergencies. However, the study also observes declining agreement on issues such as openness to coexistence with Arabs and attitudes toward the length of the war—signaling the limits of social tolerance under security strain.

F. Preservation of Ethos Components

Findings regarding the perception of ethos reveal the dominance of national foundations among youth without concurrent erosion of liberal components. This supports the conclusion that the national‑liberal balance remains largely stable: Zionist on the one hand, yet moderately liberal on the other, contradicting the “zero‑sum” assumption (Peleg, 2019). 

The continued high level of support for freedom of expression and certain principles of civic tolerance even under wartime conditions demonstrates democratic resilience alongside a robust national ethos. These findings align with previous scholarship describing Israeli youth as combining state loyalty with civic commitment even under security challenges (Kimmerling, 2001).

G. Socio‑Political Trends

Results indicate marked stability of the right‑wing bloc as the leading ideological current among pre‑enlistment youth, representing the moral backbone of the upcoming generation. Identification with the right consistently ranges between 40–45 percent, reflecting internalization of a national‑security ethos. This pattern accords with prior studies highlighting the persistence of national‑security orientation among young Israelis despite social shifts (Gidron & Hall, 2017). However, the “Other” category shows significant and steady growth over the decade, suggesting disillusionment with existing political frameworks and a desire for alternative political structures. This trend, evident throughout most of the decade and accelerating markedly in the last year, may represent the early formation of new political identities among the rising generation.

5.Conclusion

The present study points to a potential ideational-value shift among Israeli youth: while the national–liberal value balance is maintained, the influence of socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic variables has weakened, indicating a strengthening of collectivist over individualist and tribal orientations. In addition, support for political frameworks outside the traditional alignments has effectively doubled, with a notable tilt toward the right side of the political spectrum.

It is important to emphasize that despite two consecutive years of complex, multi-front war and intense socio-political contention, Israeli youths maintain a stable consensus across most social and democratic dimensions, including norms of legal representation, freedom to express opinions and demonstrate, and the institutional standing of the Knesset.

Findings indicate that motivation among youth to serve in the IDF, especially in combat roles, rose substantially and consistently in the two years following the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” War, marking a clear reversal relative to 2022. The motivational balance shifted toward security-oriented drivers at the expense of individualistic ones. 

Senses of mission, defense, and shared fate returned to the forefront and amplified willingness for combat service, after a prewar period in which personal and instrumental motives weighed more heavily. Notably, the public debate surrounding Haredi conscription did not dampen youth willingness to serve in the IDF, including in combat tracks.

The family continues to function as a central motivation multiplier, with clear intergenerational value transmission despite the unprecedented burden on reservists. Parental service and household norms orient perceptions of threat, commitment, and willingness for combat service. Distinct patterns often emerge in the respective contributions of fathers and mothers to security-oriented versus civic-liberal motives, shaping initial zeal and its translation into preferred military placement. Household support, perceived fairness, and a sense of meaning operate as bridging conditions between value-driven impulse and persistence in demanding service pathways.

In sum, the implications are that a shift is taking shape among Israeli youth in which commitment to national–liberal values is retained while collectivism clearly strengthens over individualism and tribal affiliation. The weakening influence of socioeconomic and geographic factors suggests that youth attitudes are shaped less by social-class background and more by a sense of national partnership in the wake of a national shock. This phenomenon is also reflected in expanding support for distinctive, less traditional political frameworks, with a growing inclination toward the right. Nevertheless, future research should assess whether this represents a durable, long-term trajectory or short-term ripples of national trauma.

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