The Arab-Islamic “Emergency Summit” convened in Qatar on September 15, 2025, following Israel’s strike against Hamas leadership in Doha, once again underscored the internal divisions and rivalries among participating states. At the same time, it highlighted that for several of them, advancing normalization with Israel remains a key priority—even in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli operation in Doha, and maybe because of it.

A notable paradox was Iran’s participation in the summit, despite its attack on American bases in Qatar and Iraq on June 23, 2025. Iran’s president was received cordially, condemned Israel for the strike, and accused it of violating international law.

Although the summit produced strong condemnations of Israel, participants were unable to agree on any concrete measures—such as revisiting the Abraham Accords or considering their expansion to additional states.

These challenges reflect the broader fragmentation of the Arab-Islamic world. The summit brought together countries such as Qatar and Turkey, aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, alongside Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt, which strongly oppose the Brotherhood’s ideology. Iran’s presence added another layer of complexity, given its pursuit of regional influence and a nuclear program, which most states in the region view with concern, as well as its identity as a Shiite state in contrast to the predominantly Sunni countries attending the summit.

Despite the harsh rhetoric, the true strategic priorities of some states became evident.

Syria has maintained channels of communication with Israel regarding potential security arrangements that, over time, could lay the groundwork for more diplomatic understandings, though significant obstacles remain.

Lebanon has continued—at least declaratively—efforts to address Hezbollah’s armed status, aware that failure to do so may prompt Israel to act military and decisively, as it has in recent military operations.

Both cases are heavily influenced by U.S. diplomatic engagement encouraging greater stability and dialogue with Israel.

Even Qatar has not ruled out further involvement in negotiations related to the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas, while also seeking to maintain a role in Gaza’s future governance—something Israel should firmly oppose.

Jordan, though among the strongest critics of Israel, recognizes that its bilateral relationship with Israel serves vital national interests, given internal pressures from Islamist movements and external security challenges, including instability in Syria and the potential threat posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The most notable development from Israel’s perspective was the position taken by Egypt. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi proposed an Arab-Islamic security cooperation framework—despite its limited prospects for success—warned of risks to the peace treaty with Israel, and implicitly referred to Israel as an “enemy”. His remarks, coupled with Egypt’s significant military buildup in Sinai and reported treaty violations, warrant careful monitoring in Jerusalem, even as the overall peace framework is unlikely to be fundamentally threatened.

In conclusion, rather than distancing themselves from Israel, many Arab and Muslim states continue to seek closer engagement—motivated in part by Israel’s demonstrated military capabilities across multiple arenas (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran), as well as by its strong strategic partnership with the United States. Together, these factors reinforce Israel’s regional position and serve as leverage in advancing further normalization.

Dr. Omer Dostri is an expert on national security and military strategy. he served as the spokesman for the Israeli Prime Minister in the years 2024-2025. He serves as a Senior Research Fellow at David Institute for Security Policy.